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Rallying Around Islam

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The fault lines of global conflict were henceforth to be the borders of civilizations: so proclaimed the American political scientist Samuel Huntington in a much-discussed essay that appeared in the middle of the year. Huntington supported his argument for the salience of civilizational conflict largely by pointing to skirmishes already under way on the frontiers of Islam — in Bosnia to Islam's west, in Azerbaijan to its north, in Sudan to its south, and in Kashmir to its east. "Islam has bloody borders," wrote Huntington. He also pointed to the prevalence of what he called "civilizational rallying" in Islam — expressions of solidarity among Muslims — as evidence of a growing sense of civilizational loyalty that crossed national frontiers.[1]

Yet others saw an Islamic civilization divided against itself, both politically and culturally. "Civilizations do not control states," wrote the American political scientist Fouad Ajami. "States control civilizations." It was the state that defined the boundaries of effective political action, not amorphous civilizations, especially in Islam, with its 50 states.[2] Olivier Roy, a French authority on Iran and Afghanistan, also concluded that the Middle East "revolves around existing states, not around popular movements or around Islamist Internationals. The eventual accession to power of Islamist movements such as the FIS [*Front Islamique du Salut*] in Algeria will give birth, not to a renewed Pan-Islamism but rather to 'Islamo-Nationalisms.'"[3] The French scholar Maxime Rodinson argued that the homogeneity of Islam existed at present only in the negative, "in efforts to reduce Euro-American hegemony." But this did not provide the positive content for an Islamic bloc, because "the ideas and values which now reign in the Muslim world are impregnated with foreign and especially Western elements." This coexistence of values within the Islamic world diminished its cohesiveness. "An Islamic bloc does not seem to be one of the potential developments in international relations in the decades to come," Rodinson concluded.[4]

While this debate raged in the journals, Muslims clashed daily: with non-Muslims in the name of Islam, and with other Muslims over the meaning of Islam. It was impossible to say where the more unstable fault line ran. But it was obvious that even those pledged to promoting unity devoted energies not only to confronting the West, but to confronting each another. While the West heard only the gunfire on Islam's frontiers, Muslims found the clash within Islam's civilization to be deafening.

THE ICO AND BOSNIA

The formal framework for the collaboration of Islamic states, the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), continued to wrestle with the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina (for previous Islamic diplomacy on Bosnia, see *MECS* 1992, pp. 218–20). Combined Islam could do little to assist the Bosnian Muslims in a war in distant Europe. But

some ICO members possessed enormous stockpiles of weaponry, and this dictated the thrust of ICO diplomacy: to bring about the lifting of the UN-imposed arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the previous ICO foreign ministers conference in Jidda in December 1992, the ICO had set 15 January 1993 as a deadline for implementation of UN resolutions on Serb withdrawal. If that deadline passed, the ICO would advise its members to "respond positively" to Bosnian Muslim requests for arms. On 11 January, the bureau of the ICO summit convened in Dakar to consider the impending expiration of the deadline. Bosnian Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic attended, urging the ICO to break the arms embargo. So did Turkish President Turgut Özal, who urged the ICO to convene an emergency summit after 15 January.[5] ICO Secretary-General Hamid Algabid also floated the idea of an emergency summit.[6]

But the ICO did not venture to defy the UN, and the 15 January deadline passed without the ICO issuing a call to disregard the arms embargo. Iran's foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, called openly for a lifting of the embargo. The deadline had passed, he argued. The international community had done nothing, and time only worked in favor of the Serbs.[7] The *Tehran Times* called the ICO's performance "weak," claiming that it could have "prevented a great many crimes perpetrated by the Serbs." At least it should have provided food and medical supplies by air-drops; Iran and Pakistan could have done so on behalf of the Islamic world, under UN supervision.[8] In Velayati's view, the Bosnian crisis had "eroded the ICO's credibility," demonstrating that it lacked any "enforcement mechanism."[9] A Bosnian paper, published in Zaghreb, also criticized the ICO for failing to move after the 15 January deadline. The paper pointed out that the ICO members commanded over 50 UN votes, vast oil resources, and Muslim public support. Yet recent tragic events did "not exist at all" for the ICO.[10]

ICO foreign ministers met in their 21st foreign ministers' conference in Karachi, Pakistan, from 25–29 April.[11] Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Siladjzic explained his demand simply: "We don't want humanitarian aid, we want weapons....Feeding a man who is only to be killed is cynical."[12] The conference passed a resolution reiterating the demand that the UN lift the arms embargo. But the ICO limited its own action to lobbying the five permanent members of the Security Council. Algabid visited Washington and London, but the arms embargo remained in place.

In May, the Security Council endorsed a new peace plan. Unlike the earlier Vance-Owen plan, which had been predicated on Serb withdrawal, this new plan called for the establishment of UN-declared safe havens in Sarajevo and five Muslim enclaves. The UN secretary-general, Butrus Butrus-Ghali, appealed for the dispatch of 7,600 troops to constitute the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the defense of these enclaves.

The ICO condemned the safe haven plan as implicit legitimation of Serb territorial gains. But once the plan won Security Council endorsement, some ICO states proposed that Islamic forces be raised to defend the safe havens. The Iranian and Pakistani foreign ministers both indicated a willingness to send peacekeeping troops. This idea gained some momentum as Western countries balked at putting their soldiers in harm's way.

On 12–13 July, the ICO convened a special meeting of the foreign ministers of 16 member states in Islamabad, to discuss the question of providing Muslim peacekeeping troops.[13] On 13 July, seven ICO members announced their willingness to send up to

17,000 peacekeepers for deployment by the UN. Iran was prepared to send up to 10,000; Pakistan, 2,500; Malaysia, 1,500; Bangladesh, 1,220; Tunisia, 1,000; and the PLO, 1,000. Turkey also expressed its willingness to send troops, but wished to pursue its request separately. According to the ICO, the first of these troops could be dispatched within four to six weeks. The ICO added the proviso that its members should be represented at the highest level in UNPROFOR's command structure.[14] This time, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati waxed enthusiastic: The ICO's decision was "unique and unprecedented."[15]

But the Security Council obviously regarded the possible introduction of Muslim forces into Europe's greatest trouble spot with trepidation. The US made it clear that while the UN remained free to decide the composition of its deployments in Bosnia, the US would look unfavorably on the introduction of Iranian troops.[16] In the end, the UN disregarded the ICO's offer, and Western countries put up the necessary forces. Turkey's offer would later be accepted by the Security Council in 1994, but only after Russian troops arrived in Sarajevo.[17] As compensation to the ICO, the UN later offered it a role in contributing troops to peacekeeping in Somalia (along with the Organization of African Unity and the Arab League).[18] But by boxing the ICO out of Bosnia, the Security Council indicated that it regarded the Bosnian crisis as a civil war in a Western country, best contained by the West itself.

While the ICO could not send arms or troops, it could still send donations. At the Karachi conference, Bosnian Foreign Minister Siladjzic asked for $260m. in foreign aid. ICO members pledged $80m.,[19] according to the following breakdown: Saudi Arabia, $20m.; Iran, $20m. (in addition to a previous $80m.);[20] Turkey, $20m. (in addition to a previous $20m.); Kuwait, $10m.; and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), $10m. Pakistan also pledged $5m. in kind (in addition to a previous $10m. in cash and $20m. in kind).[21] When the UN high commissioner for refugees appealed to the world to take 1,278 wounded Bosnians, only two Islamic states did so: Saudi Arabia (which took 54) and Jordan (which took 20). The rest were taken by Western states, notably by Italy (454), the US (350), Finland (100), and France (98).[22] In an offer of supreme cynicism, Libya tried to use the Bosnian suffering to break out of its air embargo (see chapter on Libya). Libya volunteered to take 60 wounded Bosnians, but only if they were brought on Libyan Arab Airways planes.[23] Saudi Arabia saw fit to award the Faysal prize for service to Islam to Bosnian President Ali Izetbegovic. It carried an award of $93,000 and a gold medallion weighing 200 grams.[24]

ICO PRIORITIES

The ICO's preoccupation with Bosnia did not sit well with some of its members. PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat had wanted Israel's deportation of over 400 Palestinians at the top of the agenda at Dakar in January.[25] He did not get his way. Faruq Qaddumi, the PLO foreign minister, expressed open dissatisfaction with the mere $10m. pledge made to the Jerusalem Fund at the Karachi conference. "Bosnia should be supported," said Qaddumi, "but Palestine should be supported too." The PLO also expressed dissatisfaction that no Palestinian was assigned to one of the four ICO deputy secretary posts, as had been ICO practice in the past. The Palestinian delegation proposed that a fifth post be created. But Saudi Arabia, which bankrolled much of the ICO's activities, clearly remained intent on punishing the PLO for its conduct during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and opposed the creation of an additional post.[26] This

Saudi policy would leave the PLO nearly bankrupt and ripe for a far-reaching compromise with Israel. When that compromise took the form of the Oslo accord between Israel and the PLO in September, the ICO secretariat quickly moved to endorse it.[27]

Two ICO members remained under UN embargo for their own past misconduct: Iraq and Libya. The Karachi conference refused to call for the lifting of those embargoes, reflecting the inclination of the ICO to follow the UN's lead. Several members also waved accusing fingers at one another, charging interference in domestic affairs. In particular, states besieged by domestic Islamic opposition movements accused Sudan and Iran of sponsoring "terrorism" by their alleged support of such movements. The Karachi conference set up a committee to draft a "code of conduct" for Muslim states and establish a definition of terrorism. Members of the committee included Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, Malaysia and Algeria. Iran expressed its opposition to the creation of the committee.[28]

Within the Islamic world, the most painful conflict remained the war in Afghanistan, where rival factions had battled for possession of Kabul, the capital, since its fall to Islamic guerrillas in April 1992. Although many factions clashed in Kabul, the core of the struggle pitted Afghan President Burhan al-Din Rabbani against Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. On 11 March, a peace accord brokered by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was signed in Mecca, with Saudi King Fahd and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as guarantors. The ICO was involved in the negotiation of the agreement, and was to have taken part in a commission to monitor violations, along with Pakistani representatives and members of each Afghan faction. ICO Secretary-General Algabid radiated optimism: "The ICO is very honored by this confidence placed in it by the Afghan leadership and will spare no effort to play the role assigned to it in reaching an accord."[29] But the agreement collapsed almost immediately, leaving the ICO to issue repeated appeals for a cease-fire and adherence to the agreement.[30]

And so the ICO struggled through yet another year, buffeted by the winds of Western priorities and the cross-currents of Islamic rivalries. Its place in the emerging world order remained as uncertain as ever. Its own member states usually preferred the mediation and peacekeeping prowess of the UN. Within the Islamic world, it was increasingly challenged from below, by Pan-Islamic organizations and institutions sponsored by Islamic opposition movements. The ICO continued to depend on the ability of regimes to articulate a credible vision of Islamic unity, at a moment when they themselves faced burgeoning Islamic opposition at home.

THE ISLAM OF OBEDIENCE

In one of her scenarios of the future, the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi pointed to the emergence of a "tele-petro-Islam": satellite-transmitted electronic indoctrination in obedience and obscurantism.[31] Certainly, many regimes would have wished to create just such a monopoly on the expression of Islam. In practice, they had considerable difficulty in getting their own message out, in giving it any coherence, and in coordinating their own efforts.

THE SAUDI-EGYPTIAN PARTNERSHIP

In formulating an obedient Islam, Saudi Arabia and Egypt had formed a partnership, with Saudi Arabia providing the financial brawn, and Egypt providing the intellectual brain.

Saudi Arabia continued to sponsor a large missionary apparatus, under the auspices of the Muslim World League (MWL; *Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami*). The number of its missionaries remained stable, at about 1,000 deployed in 82 countries. The breakdown by continent was 444 in Asia, 391 in Africa, 40 in Europe, 34 in North America, 14 in South America, and 13 in Australia.[32] But the MWL had a problem: Many of the Muslims whom it had supported turned out to be disobedient. During the year, the MWL cropped up repeatedly in the press, as having spearheaded the recruiting drive of Muslim volunteers for Afghanistan. These "Afghan Arabs" allegedly posed growing threats to their own governments.[33] The MWL grew sensitive to the charge that it had midwifed the birth of a new Islamic "terrorism." In June, it issued a statement explaining that the MWL had won world respect because it refrained from interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. "The MWL does not engage in such pernicious activities and does not even entertain the idea of supporting extremism and terrorism."[34] (For more on the Afghan Arabs, see below.)

Egypt had the greatest cause for complaint on this score. It was reasonably satisfied that Saudi Arabia had learned its lesson. "The Saudis realized that you cannot play with fire," said Egyptian Interior Minister 'Abd al-Halim Musa. "Having said that, there may still be Saudis who help the terrorists on a personal basis."[35] But an unnamed Egyptian official remained more skeptical at the Saudi awakening: "It may be the beginning of the end of the sort of benign neglect observed by the Saudi Government toward those funding terrorists. But they have to do a lot more to convince that they are serious."[36]

The MWL also continued to dabble in dialogue with the Vatican. Its interest in Muslim-Christian dialogue did not run deep, but such contacts confirmed the MWL's self-image as a pillar of normative Islam. MWL Secretary-General 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif met with Pope John Paul II in February, and they discussed the regularization of their dialogue.[37] At the end of the year, Nasif was replaced as secretary by Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali, who had been the governor of the Islamic Development Bank.

In this partnership, Egypt took the lead in organizing Islamic conferences against "extremism." The fifth conference of Egypt's Higher Council for Islamic Affairs was typical of these initiatives. The idea of a conference on "the struggle against religious extremism" belonged to Egypt's minister of religious endowments, Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub, who announced his plans following a conference of Arab interior ministers in Tunis. Mahjub said the conference would "define a common action which will inform the world on the true visage of tolerance and moderation of Islam."[38] The conference met from 19–21 January in Cairo, and was attended by 300 participants, including many government ministers of religious affairs and Islamic endowments, 'Ulama, and muftis from abroad. Among the notable participants were Shaykh Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq, the shaykh of al-Azhar and president of the conference; Syria's minister of Islamic endowments, 'Abd al-Majid al-Tarabulsi; the chief mufti of Syria, Shaykh Ahmad Kiftaru; the chief mufti of Mount Lebanon province, Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali al-Juzu; the Saudi minister of Islamic endowments, Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab 'Abd al-Wasi'; former Sudanese president 'Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-

Dhahab; Algerian minister of religious affairs, Sassi Lamouri; Moroccan minister of Islamic endowments and affairs, 'Abd al-Karim al-'Alawi al-Mudaghry; and Wilfried (Murad) Hofmann, the German ambassador to Morocco and a convert to Islam.

The conference was opened by Egypt's Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi, who read a message from Egypt's President Husni Mubarak, warning against the dangers of "extremism."[39] As expected, the conference resolutions condemned all acts of "violence and terrorism," and called on Muslim states not to intervene in the affairs of neighbors.[40] The same resolutions were passed by the fifth conference of the "International Islamic Council for Da'wa and Relief," whose 200 participants met in Cairo from 20–21 October.[41]

These massive conferences had their critics within Egypt, mostly from within the ranks of the Islamic opposition. One Egyptian critic, a former Azhar dean, complained that "enormous sums are spent and tremendous energies are wasted on these conferences, on preparation and putting up people, most of whom the Islamic world has never heard of." Another Egyptian cleric declared that the people looked upon the participants "as government-sponsored scholars, who say only what is scripted for them. The talk of extremism, terrorism, and violence has no value, and does not solve problems — it fuels them." The Egyptian Islamist writer Fahmi Huwaydi called the conferences a media show. "They address themselves to governments, not people. We have never seen them achieve any benefit. The expenditure on them is part of the great deal of irrelevant spending the government does."[42]

It also seemed possible that Egypt's Islamic establishment, like the MWL, had inadvertently fostered the very "extremism" it now sought to combat. A case in point was Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali, on whom the regime relied to provide intellectual substance to its Islamic legitimacy. Ghazzali had already been a party to one failed attempt to coopt Islam. In the mid-1980s, Algeria's president, Chadli Benjedid, met Ghazzali, and proposed that he come to Algeria and establish an Islamic university in Constantine. Ghazzali, then in Saudi Arabia, moved to Algeria, where he participated in Islamic conferences and hosted a weekly television show on Islam. Given the subsequent surge of opposition Islam in Algeria, it remained an open question whether Ghazzali's preaching had helped Chadli or damned him. Back in Egypt, Ghazzali became a television star and symposium gadfly, whose interviews and columns appeared widely in the Egyptian and Saudi press. Ghazzali therefore seemed the ideal state witness to testify against the Islamist assassins of a noted secularist author, Faraj Fuda, who had campaigned against the Islamist program. But when Ghazzali took the witness stand, his testimony backfired. He called Fuda's objecting to implementation of the Shari'a "blasphemy," and said he knew of no punishment for a Muslim who killed an apostate.[43] The Ghazzali episode demonstrated once more that the attempt by both Egypt and Saudi Arabia to cultivate an Islam of obedience may have boomeranged.

HIGH MINARET IN MOROCCO

Another state made supplementary efforts to fashion an Islam amenable to the status quo. Morocco took the lead from the far west of Islam. King Hasan II had never been a team player in the region-wide contest of regimes with Islamism. He did not sympathize with the Algerian regime, and once argued that the electoral process there should have been continued, to provide fundamentalists with a "laboratory" to test

their ideas. This was hardly the view of the governments in Egypt and Tunisia. But Hasan possessed a royal and Islamic legitimacy that presidents could only envy. He had also boxed his Islamist opposition squarely in the corner. During the year, Morocco took a number of measures that gave it new prominence in the expression of obedient Islam.

From 26–27 January, Marrakesh hosted the Second World Conference of Friday Prayer Leaders, at the invitation of Morocco's minister of Islamic endowments and affairs, 'Abd al-Kabir al-'Alawi al-Mudaghry. The first conference had met in Fez back in 1987 (see *MECS* 1987, pp. 159–60), but so many years had passed that its revival constituted a new initiative. The pulpits of prayer leaders were a major platform for the dissemination of state Islam. In his message to participants, King Hasan urged them to come up with a clear, unified line for their sermons from the pulpit. The conference also established a permanent league (*rabita*) of preachers, and drew up a constitution. This called for a higher council to meet every year, and a general conference every three years.[44] Through this organization, Morocco sought to articulate a persuasive language to counter the Islamists, although it was not clear whether this would work in countries whose rulers lacked the religious legitimacy of Morocco's king. This language was further refined in the third Summer University on the Islamic Revival (*al-Jami'a al-Sayfiyya li'l-Sahwa al-Islamiyya*), which met in Casablanca from 9–11 September, on the theme of tolerance in Islamic civilization.[45]

King Hasan also assumed that his Islam would resonate even more powerfully if it emanated from a powerful monument. On 30 August, he inaugurated the "King Hasan II" mosque in Casablanca, on a promontory overlooking the Atlantic. It was the largest in the world, as attested by the sheer quantities of cement, marble, and granite which went into it. The mosque had taken five years to construct. Some 30,000 workers and technicians, and another 10,000 artisans, had labored on it. It boasted the highest minaret in the world at 200 meters, topped by a green laser beam pointing to Mecca. The prayer hall was covered by a 1,100-ton roof that slid open. The mosque could accommodate 25,000 worshippers inside, and another 80,000 on the esplanade. It had been built at an estimated cost of $600m., half raised by a public subscription pushed by zealous provincial governors.[46] Here was a monumental reminder that King Hasan also bore the title of "Commander of the Faithful." Its French architect said that the mosque's size was indeed meant to reflect the place of Morocco in Islam. But the only Arab leader who attended the inauguration was Lebanon's prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri. The rest stayed away, notably the Saudis and Gulf Arabs, who were reportedly annoyed at the grandiosity of the mosque.[47] Saudi King Fahd did, however, present the mosque with 5,000 copies of the Qur'an.[48]

The year also witnessed a marked improvement in Moroccan relations with Iran, including the exchange of ambassadors and visits by government ministers. It seemed that even Iran was impressed by King Hasan's durability as a Muslim leader. Iran certainly preferred Morocco over Saudi Arabia as a partner in Sunni-Shi'i dialogue. And since Iran's relations with Algeria had deteriorated over the crisis there, Iran had to seek new friends in North Africa. In November, Hasan received a delegation of Iranian clerics from the Academy for Reconciliation of Islamic Schools (*Majma' al-Taqrib bayna al-Madhahib al-Islamiyya*), including Shaykh Muhammad Wa'ith-zadeh Khorasani, secretary-general, and Sayyid Muhammad Ishaq Madani, advisor for Sunni affairs to Iran's president and member of the academy's supreme council.

They discussed with Hasan the need to standardize Sunni and Shi'i rites, and agreed to formulate a working document within four months to be submitted at a future meeting in Rabat.[49]

Would these attempts to formulate a moderate Islam in conferences work? Algeria provided a sobering precedent. For years, the Algerian regime had sponsored an annual Symposium on Islamic Thought (*Multaqa al-Fikr al-Islami*), which had been held each June for 23 consecutive years. It had been founded by Malek Bennabi and cultivated by Houari Boumedienne and Chadli Benjedid, and met each year in an Algiers hotel. The audiences were large, and the television broadcast the proceedings. The symposium's pillars were members of the Algerian Ministry of Religious Endowments, and it was a forum for enlightened, forward-looking Islam.[50] The forum was now suspended, and some in Algeria asked whether it had contributed to the very phenomenon it was meant to neutralize.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1993

Saudi Arabia still controlled a fount of religious legitimacy that no lavish conference or big mosque could rival: custodianship of Mecca, which every Muslim had to visit once in a lifetime. The Saudi monarchy reserved the right to set the tone of the Meccan pilgrimage, by banning all politics except its own. Saudi King Fahd achieved this by his annual speech to heads of the pilgrimage missions in Mina. In 1993, this speech included pleas for Afghan Mujahidin to settle their differences, a defense of Bosnian Muslims, and an endorsement of the Arab-Israeli peace process based on "the principle of exchanging land for peace." The talks would "inevitably lead to peace," for which there was "no other alternative."[51] This message found a captive audience in the multitudes of foreign pilgrims. This year they included 300 Bosnian Muslims, flown in by King Fahd at his expense.[52]

To preserve a monopoly of messages, the Saudis issued their standard warnings against political activity and the import of books, journals, and leaflets.[53] They also sought to discourage repeat pilgrims, who were likely to focus more on politics than on the ritual obligations they had already fulfilled. Fahd pointed out that the pilgrimage was not required of a Muslim more than once.[54] The high *'alim* of Saudi Islam, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz, issued a fatwa affirming that money spent on a second pilgrimage was better spent on support for refugees and Mujahidin, like those in Afghanistan.[55]

It also seemed that Iran and Saudi Arabia had reached a final understanding on the extent of Iran's own use of the Meccan platform. The number of Iranian pilgrims, long a bone of contention, remained steady at 115,000, by mutual agreement.[56] Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri, who headed Iran's pilgrims, once again set a conciliatory tone as the 1993 season approached, reminding Iranians that "it would be the greatest sin if the dignity of Iranian pilgrims were to be cast in disrepute." He therefore called on Iran's pilgrims to pray with Sunni brothers in congregational prayer.[57] And Saudi-Iranian political relations were generally on the upswing. Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati visited Saudi Arabia on his Gulf tour as the pilgrimage got underway, and there was talk of a visit by King Fahd to Iran and a summit with Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. There was no reason to expect any change in the Meccan status quo, which provided for one Iranian rally in Mecca.[58]

On 27 May, the Iranians were to have held their annual rally for the "disavowal of the infidels." This was the occasion for chants and banners of "Death to America" and "Death to Israel," and the delivery of a message to the pilgrims from Iran's leader, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i. But much to the consternation of the Iranians, Saudi police threw up roadblocks around the rally site, opposite the headquarters of the Iranian pilgrims. Police turned away the pilgrims who arrived for the rally. Reyshahri protested that this violated the understanding between the two governments, and was "unjustifiable." "It was only due to my recommendation to have revolutionary patience, and also due to the obedience of the pilgrims, that we were able to control their feelings, so as to make sure that no incident occurred."[59] The Saudis justified their action. They had always opposed such "unruly processions interspersed with cheers and shouting of sensational slogans," and had warned Reyshahri it would not be tolerated.[60] Saudi Arabia reiterated its "categorical rejection of the staging of marches, gatherings, and demonstrations in general."[61] Ibn Baz made a statement against Iran's "disavowal of the infidels" march in particular, calling the practice a "groundless heresy" that could have "evil consequences."[62]

In a quick shift, Reyshahri rallied Iran's pilgrims five days later at their camp in Mina to hear Khamene'i's message, which he also had broadcast in Arabic over loudspeakers. This message took precisely the opposite view of Fahd's message to the pilgrims on every major point, and included denunciations of the US and a call for the elimination of Israel.[63] According to the Iranians, the Saudis quickly dispatched security forces to the site, but they were caught by surprise and could only encircle the rally. There was no clash.[64] The Saudis claimed they did not notice any such gathering in the Iranian camp.[65] Back in Mecca, the Saudis put up a tight security cordon around the Iranian pilgrimage headquarters once again, preventing pilgrims from entering or leaving.[66] Reyshahri left Saudi Arabia early, to protest the Saudi action.[67]

After the incident, the Saudis resumed their conciliatory tone toward Iran. The Iranian demonstration in Mecca violated their monopoly on the politics of the pilgrimage. But they only acted against it when they were reasonably certain that Iran would not launch a counter-campaign of Islamic mud-slinging. They were right: Iran decided to let the matter slide, at least for this year. Even Majlis Speaker 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, known as a critic of the Saudi management of Mecca, chose to play the incident down: "We believe [the Saudi decision] was due to pressure by others from outside, compelling Saudi Arabia to prevent the rally. But this will not give way to a severance in our relations. We should daily improve our ties with regional and neighboring countries, and we should mutually resolve bilateral issues."[68] The peace of Mecca was preserved, but Iran's resentment still simmered beneath the Saudi-imposed silence.

LIBYANS IN JERUSALEM

The pilgrimage to Mecca was overshadowed by another pilgrimage of an unusual sort. As the Meccan pilgrimage reached its climax, the Muslim world witnessed the astonishing sight of Libyans, dressed in the white garments of pilgrims to Mecca, making their way instead through the streets of Jerusalem.

The origins of the episode could be traced to UN Resolution 748, which put Libya under embargo for refusing to hand over suspects in the bombing of an American airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. Under this resolution, all countries,

including Arab countries, had suspended flights to and from Libya, beginning in April 1992. At that time, Libya had hoped to break the embargo by insisting on its right to fly its pilgrims to Mecca. Saudi Arabia had no intention of breaking the embargo, and let Libya understand that pilgrims' flights would not be welcome. Libya, denouncing Saudi Arabia for complying with the UN, effected a boycott of the 1992 pilgrimage (see *MECS* 1992, p. 217).

As the 1993 pilgrimage approached, Libya again demanded that Saudi Arabia receive pilgrims carried by Libya's national airlines. At the ICO foreign ministers' conference in Karachi (see above), Libya demanded that Saudi airspace be opened, to allow as many as 25,000 Libyans to fly in for the pilgrimage.[69] Saudi Arabia again indicated that Libyan pilgrims were welcome if they came via third countries, but that Saudi Arabia would not facilitate direct flights from Libya.

This time, however, Libya did not intend to settle for a boycott. It began to send out initial feelers to Israel about the possibility of sending a group of Libyan pilgrims to Jerusalem. The conduit for this initiative was the president of the World Association of Libyan Jews, Rafaelo Fellah, an Italian citizen, who met with Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi in February and March. Fellah's agenda was compensation for the confiscated property of Libyan Jews, most of whom were resident in Israel and Italy. Among those involved in the scheme to bring the Libyan pilgrims were Israeli businessman Ya'akov Nimrodi, who owned a Jerusalem-based company for Muslim tourism, and Saudi businessman 'Adnan Khashoggi.[70] These two veterans of the Iran-Contra intrigue were apparently inspired by the prospect of profit that seemed to lurk beneath the surface of the Libyan initiative. They had little difficulty in persuading the Israeli Government to accept the Libyans, since Israel was eager to demonstrate its fair administration of Muslim holy places. Israel put its case before the US, which swallowed hard and gave its assent to Israel's admission of the Libyan pilgrims.[71]

On 31 May, at the height of the Meccan pilgrimage, 192 Libyan pilgrims arrived in Israel after having been bused for four days across Libya and Egypt. The floodgates of speculation opened wide. Nimrodi billed the visit as a political breakthrough, predicting Libyan recognition of Israel and a visit to Jerusalem by Qadhdhafi himself by year's end. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that Israel put no hindrance before members of other faiths who wanted to make pilgrimages to Jerusalem, and that Qadhdhafi (like any Arab leader) was "welcome to come and visit Israel at any time."[72] Various Israeli ministers speculated wildly on the political import of the visit. Only deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin sounded a cautionary note. He was concerned that a too-enthusiastic reception of the Libyans would offend the US. Beilin announced that Israel had no intention of saving Libya from its present status as a "leper state."[73]

Palestinians also read a political overture into the visit. The West Bank and Gaza had been under closure for some two months, and many Palestinians could not enter Jerusalem to pray at al-Aqsa mosque. The trustees of the Islamic religious endowments in Jerusalem said it was tragic that Libyans were allowed in, while Palestinians were kept out.[74] When the Libyan pilgrims arrived at the entrance to al-Aqsa, Palestinians heaped abuse on them, and they were only admitted after they pleaded pious innocence of any political purpose.[75] The spokesmen of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad deportees in Lebanon also called the visit "an indelible mark of shame on the brow of Qadhdhafi."[76]

Libya, for its part, remained consistent in its explanation of the visit. As a Libyan ambassador explained, the Christian West had "banned" Libyans from traveling to Mecca, and the Saudi Government had done nothing to help them. The visit to Jerusalem, "capital of the Palestinian state," occurred only because the pilgrims had been prevented from reaching Mecca.[77] Qadhdhafi himself explained that the pilgrims "drove to Jerusalem to explain to the world that they were prohibited from going to Mecca, and so had no choice but to go to Jerusalem."[78] A "pilgrim" interviewed on his return to Libya by Libyan television delivered a long monologue against Saudi Arabia: "The Iraqis are now deprived of the Hajj rites; tomorrow it will be the Iranians; the day after tomorrow it will be the Egyptians....This is of course unacceptable; the sacred places are supposed to be open to all Muslims in the world."[79]

That Libya intended to de-legitimize Saudi Arabia, but not legitimize Israel, became clear in the statement of the pilgrims' spokesman at a Jerusalem press conference, in the presence of the Israeli organizers and foreign ministry officials. "Only by our presence here are our brothers aware that we are not able to do our religious duty," announced the spokesman, who proceeded to urge "holy fighters from Yemen and Iraq to liberate the holy places of Mecca and Medina." But this was not the only call for liberation: "From here we call on Muslims from all over the world to contribute to the liberation of Jerusalem, which must be the capital of the Palestinian state." The Libyan announced that Israel did not exist, called upon the Jews "to topple the Zionist leadership," and demanded the return of Jewish immigrants to their lands of origin.[80]

Israelis were appalled at these remarks. The Israeli organizers emerged from the news conference flustered. Ministers who had fawned over the guests rushed to distance themselves from the entire episode.[81] As a result, the entire visit was cut short; planned trips by the pilgrims to Tiberias, Acre, Bethlehem and Hebron were canceled.[82] Had Qadhdhafi planned this climax all along? Had he done a "mid-course correction" when Arab and Palestinian reaction proved so negative?[83] Or had he simply done one of his famous about-faces? It was impossible to say. One American editorialist put it succinctly: "The Israeli Government trusts a couple of shadowy characters to deal with an erratic dictator, planning a publicity coup that will flout an international embargo and offend most of the Arab world by bringing Muslims to Israel. It backfired. Surprise."[84]

Qadhdhafi's own motives remained obscure. On one level, his was an obvious attempt to break out of the grip of the embargo, and perhaps open a dialogue with the US via Israel.[85] On another level, it was an attempt to shame other Arabs in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, for upholding the embargo. Qadhdhafi managed to tweak Saudi King Fahd's nose, using an Israeli platform in Jerusalem to denounce Saudi Arabia and Israel — even as Fahd endorsed the peace process in his own annual message to the pilgrims in Mecca. But Qadhdhafi drew considerable Muslim fire, and his decision may even have caused him some domestic unrest.[86] In any event, the episode suggested that rivals to primacy in Islam would begin to tussle over Jerusalem the moment any part of it was put on the block. In 1992, Saudi Arabia gave a hint of its interest in Jerusalem, by its failed bid to renovate the city's Islamic shrines (see *MECS* 1992, pp. 215–16). In 1993, Libya's pilgrims essentially did the same, in Qadhdhafi's unpredictable and flamboyant style. (For additional aspects of the episode, see chapter on Libya.)

IRAN'S "EVIL EMPIRE"?

A noted American columnist, early in the year, described Iran as "the center of the world's new Comintern....The new threat is as evil as the old evil empire."[87] The substantiation for this analogy proved to be elusive and uneven. Iran undoubtedly ordered assassinations of Iranian opponents of the regime abroad, especially in Europe. But a question mark surrounded its support for Islamic opposition movements in other countries. Many loose accusations were leveled against Iran by regimes under siege from their own Islamists. These regimes had an obvious interest in portraying domestic unrest as Iranian-inspired, and their charges were often short on evidence. For its part, Iran took special care not to be caught in acts of subversion. Yet Iran continued to cultivate its image as the model Islamic experiment, and could not help but become entangled in the contest between regimes and Islamic oppositions. The form of that entanglement varied widely from setting to setting. Two typical examples were Turkey and Algeria.

On 24 January, a car bomb killed Uğur Mumcu, a leading journalist for the left-of-center Turkish daily newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*. Mumcu was a strict if not militant secularist. The Turkish press immediately pointed a finger at Iran, and demonstrators at Mumcu's funeral declared that "Turkey will not be another Iran." Days later, authorities arrested persons allegedly belonging to the so-called Islamic Action Organization (*İslami Hareket Örgütü*). According to Turkish Interior Minister İsmet Sezgin, they had been trained in military techniques and theology in Iran, at a "high security" installation between Tehran and Qom where military uniform was worn. Training had concentrated on assassination techniques, and those arrested were alleged to have assassinated *Hüriyyet* journalist Çetin Emeç in 1990. They were also held responsible for other assassinations and bombings. More Islamic Action members were arrested during the year, although by year's end, no one had been charged with Mumcu's murder. Yet the episode did not spin into a crisis. Iran immediately denied any interest in destabilizing Turkey, and the Turkish authorities apparently concluded that the activities of Islamic Action were not part of an Iranian campaign. The incident did no damage to Iranian-Turkish relations.[88]

This contrasted dramatically with the further deterioration of Iranian-Algerian relations, which had turned sour over Algeria's suppression of its Islamists (see *MECS* 1992, p. 202). On 27 March, Algeria severed relations with Iran, accusing Iran of interfering in Algeria's affairs by supporting the banned FIS in exile. However, the details of this support were skimpy, and the Algerian press drew only the most tenuous links between exiled FIS activists and Iran. The only precise charge accused Rabah Kebir, leader of the FIS in exile in Germany, of carrying an Iranian diplomatic passport[89] (for more on Rabah Kebir, see below).

Was Iran behind Islamist agitation in places as diverse as Turkey and Algeria? The evidence was probably stronger for Turkey than Algeria, yet Turkey made no accusations, while Algeria severed ties. In fact, all of the evidence was sufficiently murky to sustain a variety of interpretations. "We are seriously concerned over Iran's exploitation of Islamic extremist groups throughout the region," said one senior US official.[90] But the extent of that exploitation remained unclear.

THE RUSHDIE CAMPAIGN

Those who leaned toward the "evil empire" analogy found ample sustenance in the ongoing tribulations of the Indian-born British novelist Salman Rushdie, author of *The Satanic Verses*. Beginning in late 1991, Rushdie had launched a campaign to pressure Iran into lifting the fatwa of death pronounced against him in 1989 by the late Ayatollah Khomeini. This campaign consisted of public appearances and meetings with high-level officials of Western governments. Iranian figures responded by calling ever more stridently for his death, and promoting hatred of Rushdie abroad. In honor of the fourth anniversary of the fatwa, in February, a Tehran magazine ran an international contest of political cartoons featuring Rushdie. There were 5,386 entries from 27 countries, in both the youth and professional categories. According to the organizers, several themes predominated: Rushdie as an animal, Rushdie as a fleeing coward, Rushdie as an incarnation of Satan, and Rushdie either executed or dead. The best entries, as judged by the organizers, went on public exhibit.[91] This grim determination to see Rushdie dead defied not only the West but Iran's apologists in the West, who argued that Iran's revolution had turned a corner. (For recent developments in the Rushdie affair, see *MECS* 1990, pp. 177–80; 1991, pp. 187–88; 1992, pp. 208–9.)

For Rushdie, 1993 nevertheless represented a year of breakthrough. By year's end, Rushdie had achieved the highest Western endorsements: personal meetings with Irish President Mary Robinson, British Prime Minister John Major, Czech President Vaclav Havel, and US President Bill Clinton. One hundred Muslim intellectuals also published a book, in French and English, expressing support for Rushdie. All this would have been unthinkable only a year earlier.

Rushdie's campaign focused first upon his own country, Britain. Scotland Yard had successfully protected Rushdie, largely at the taxpayers' expense.[92] But Britain had preferred low-profile representations to Iran, and Rushdie himself had not been welcome at the Foreign Office. This changed dramatically in the first half of 1993. On 3 February, Rushdie was publicly received at the Foreign Office, and on 11 May, he met Prime Minister Major for half an hour. Rushdie described the meeting as a change in British policy; the Foreign Office simply indicated that it reflected Iran's failure to "repudiate the incitement to murder," which prevented "the establishment of full and friendly relations between Britain and Iran."[93]

The Iranian reaction to this public British support took a predictable form. Khamene'i issued another call for Rushdie's death: "Whoever can remove this harmful and noxious being from the path of Muslims must do so." Khomeini had released an arrow against Rushdie, said Khamene'i; it was "moving toward its target and will sooner or later hit it."[94] The bounty placed by an Iranian foundation on Rushdie's head remained in place. The foundation's director had been approached by the German ambassador to Iran and foreign journalists, who attempted to bring about a lifting of the bounty. "However, their efforts were fruitless because we have made our position clear."[95] Beyond Iran, support for this position came from predictable quarters. A thousand members of Hizballah turned out for the fatwa's anniversary in Beirut, calling for "the elimination of the microbe Rushdie."[96]

Iranian President Rafsanjani took a more evasive tack, by drawing a distinction between religion and politics which Khomeini himself might have found tendentious. The fatwa, claimed Rafsanjani, was "a religious matter, which had nothing to do with

the government." It had been issued by Khomeini in his religious capacity, not as leader of Iran, and so it remained a matter outside the competence of Iran's government.[97] Majlis Speaker Nateq-Nuri said that Iran itself would not carry out Khomeini's verdict: "Iran neither had nor has any intention of sending commandos to kill the apostate Salman Rushdie."[98] But this was as far as Iran's leaders would go to neutralize the issue. As one Iranian newspaper put it: "No one wants to be the first to even remotely suggest that the Imam [Khomeini] was wrong, by asking for the reversal of his decision on Rushdie."[99]

In the meantime, Rushdie's campaign gained momentum. Since the fatwa, he had been barred from entering France, but early in the year the French Foreign Ministry indicated that Rushdie was "welcome in France and will be protected."[100] In March, he arrived in Paris, where he was hosted by the minister of culture, Jack Lang.[101]

Later, however, Rushdie's cause suffered two setbacks. Rushdie's book had been banned in Turkey, but in May, Aziz Nesin, a Turkish publisher and professed atheist, translated and published several chapters of *The Satanic Verses* in a left-wing newspaper. There were angry demonstrations at a central Istanbul mosque, and authorities rounded up the offending newspaper on a daily basis.[102] In July, Nesin attended an Alevi cultural conference in the provincial town of Sivas. After Friday prayer, a mob assembled and put his hotel to the torch; 37 persons perished in the flames. They included two noted poets, two musicians, a leading literary critic, a cartoonist and a folk singer. (Nesin himself narrowly escaped.)[103] Rushdie blamed both sides: the secularists who used his book (in unauthorized Turkish translation) to provoke fundamentalists, who responded predictably with violence.[104] Whatever the truth, the episode suggested that Rushdie's book still served as the rallying point in Islam's own culture war. A second reminder came in October, when the Norwegian publisher whose house had translated *The Satanic Verses* was shot and wounded in Oslo.[105]

Nevertheless, Rushdie achieved his ultimate objective on 24 November, when he met Bill Clinton for five minutes, and conferred at length with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and national security adviser Anthony Lake. During an earlier trip by Rushdie to Washington, the Bush Administration had made a point of ignoring him. There were some in Clinton's Administration who doubted the wisdom of departing from this policy: Clinton later admitted that "there was some division among our people about whether I should see Mr. Rushdie."[106] But the campaign on Rushdie's behalf in America had succeeded in transforming him into a symbol of free expression. Novelists Norman Mailer and William Styron used all their influence with the White House, and their appeals finally persuaded Clinton to join Rushdie's meeting with Lake, much to Rushdie's surprise.[107] The American press generally hailed the meeting.[108] During Rushdie's visit, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also conferred an honorary doctorate upon him.

As expected, Iran attacked Clinton's decision. "The author of the Satanic book went to meet the Satan of the White House," editorialized the newspaper *Abrar*.[109] But it soon became clear that the Clinton-Rushdie meeting touched a deeper chord among Muslims elsewhere. Criticism of Clinton also came from Sunni Muslim activists and even the mainstream and semi-official press in those countries most friendly to the US, including Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Kuwait and other Gulf states.[110] These portrayed the meeting not as a challenge to Iran, but as an insult to Islam. MWL Secretary-General Nasif expressed the exasperation of those who thought it

was wiser to let the Rushdie affair fade: "Clinton should never have met him, it was not appropriate. The majority of people feel insulted by this. Salman Rushdie should have been forgotten, and now all this does is add to the problem."[111] The Arabic press universally portrayed the meeting as a blunder, which needlessly stirred up an issue in a way that embarrassed America's friends. "In matters of religious belief, emotional reactions always prevail over the rational," warned the editor of a Tunisian paper. "Let us try not to arouse old devils."[112] A Qatari newspaper lamented that the meeting would only encourage radicals "to stick by their fatwa" and "give fundamentalists an excuse to intensify their terrorism campaigns."[113] In short, while Rushdie's meetings with other heads of state evoked the predictable Iranian ire, the meeting with Clinton offended or embarrassed a much wider circle of Muslim opinion.

One White House official admitted that the reaction to the Clinton-Rushdie meeting in the wider Islamic world had been "a little more intense than he [Clinton] thought, and I think that he was kind of intrigued by it and reflecting a little bit on the symbolic power of the presidency."[114] In a subsequent interview, Clinton took one step back. He announced that his decision did not mean "that I agree with the attacks on Islam in the book that Mr. Rushdie wrote," and he made his own bow to Islam: "I respect the religion and I respect the culture enormously." He had also come to the realization that the US view of free speech was "different from that held by many Muslims throughout the world, including many who are our friends. I understand that."[115] Iran saw this as an admission of error, and its editorialists quickly concluded that "we can add this incident to the list of political blunders made by the US president, to which he himself admits."[116] Paradoxically, *The New York Times* agreed, opining that by his remarks, Clinton had "waffled needlessly."[117] *The Washington Times* called his words "silly and pathetic," and argued that Clinton "ought to be proud of having taken a stand and not try to slink away."[118]

The Rushdie affair had always been about who would define the true Islam. Would it be Khomeini, from his grave? His none-too-confident successors in Iran? Other Islamic authorities in Arab lands? Or the West, with its distinction between moderate and extreme Islam? Since this debate remained unresolved, Rushdie remained in danger. After his meeting with Clinton, Rushdie promised to return to literature, provided Western leaders kept the promises they made to him. These were far-reaching. As a result of Rushdie's campaign, the West had made any improvement in relations with Iran contingent on lifting the threat against him. It remained to be seen whether the West could muster that collective resolve, and whether it was stronger than the resolve of Khomeini's heirs.

SHIFTS IN HIZBALLAH

Iran continued to cultivate one sympathetic movement that had struck deep roots in harsh soil: Lebanon's Hizballah. This Shi'i movement continued to look toward Iran for guidance, political support, and economic aid. Iran continued to provide all three. But this did not prevent the factionalizing of what had appeared to be a monolithic movement (for more on Hizballah in its Lebanese context, see chapter on Lebanon).

It was difficult to characterize the debate in Hizballah, because it was not conducted in public. A number of Lebanese press sources, and especially the Beirut weekly *al-Shira'*, attempted to flesh out the divisive issues in the movement. Hizballah's secretary-general, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, refused to confirm or deny these press

analyses, except to say that Hizballah's followers knew that "all these reports have shaky foundations."[119] Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, a former secretary-general of Hizballah and widely regarded as head of the opposition camp, took the same view of the press as his rival Nasrallah: "Journalists and analysts have fabricated many hypotheses, but these rarely conform to reality."[120] All attempts to fathom the inner deliberations of Hizballah therefore relied on speculative reading between the lines.

At its root, the debate revolved around Hizballah's options in a Lebanon moving steadily toward internal reconciliation, reconstruction, and an agreement with Israel. Should Hizballah aspire to be a revolutionary party or a political party? This was the dilemma faced by many Islamic movements, especially when confronted by the prospect of elections. Hizballah had participated in Lebanon's parliamentary elections in 1992, but the decision remained a matter of internal controversy. The camp led by Nasrallah regarded the move as a necessary tactical adjustment; the camp led by Tufayli regarded it as a dangerous strategic concession.

As a whole, Hizballah seemed to favor the path of tactical accommodation. This was confirmed by the third congress of the movement which met on 29 April, and which reelected Nasrallah as secretary-general. Tufayli was elected to the consultative council, but he refused to take his seat, and withdrew to his hometown in the Biqa' Valley to rally his supporters.[121] Paradoxically, both Nasrallah and Tufayli claimed to derive support for their positions from the identical source: Iran's leader, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i. Each insinuated that his rival had deviated from Khamene'i's path.

Thus, Tufayli's camp claimed that Nasrallah had reverted to the way of the Da'wa Party, a Shi'i grouping which had developed independently among the clerics of Iraq and Lebanon in the 1960s. The Da'wa's adherents had their own source texts, and Khomeini loyalists had accused them of refusing to accept Khomeini's leadership. In turn, they criticized Iranian policy toward Iraq, and Iran's failure to support the Shi'i uprising against Saddam Husayn in 1991.[122] The open assault on Nasrallah was led by Sayyid Sadiq al-Musawi, a veteran of the movement who had opposed the decision to participate in elections. He alleged that Nasrallah had infiltrated the Da'wa view into Hizballah, duping Iran in the process. American and Lebanese intelligence had lured Nasrallah into the trap of participating in Lebanese elections.[123] Another shaykh wrote an open letter announcing his departure from Hizballah, charging that Hizballah's leadership was faithful first and foremost not to the vision of Khomeini but to the Da'wa Party.[124] One of the charges against the Da'wa was that it did not insist on rule by Muslim clerics. A group of Hizballah clerics reportedly wrote to Khamene'i, accusing Nasrallah of "marginalizing the role of the virtuous," and entrusting affairs to non-clerics, so that of the clerics, "only a very limited number have not been isolated."[125]

Nasrallah dismissed this charge that he had infiltrated the ideas of the Da'wa into Hizballah. According to him, those in Hizballah who had been members of the Da'wa left behind the doctrines of their former party, and were even critical of them; and the decision to enter elections was not a sign of disloyalty to Khomeini's path. To the contrary: Khomeini's successor, Khamene'i "blessed our decision to enter the elections battle." Any attack on Hizballah for this decision constituted an attack on Khamene'i himself.[126]

In return, Nasrallah's camp insinuated that Tufayli referred back to a dubious Iranian authority: the radical cleric Seyyed 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami, who, as Iranian

ambassador to Syria in the 1980s, had played a crucial role in creating Hizballah. Mohtashami, after a stint as interior minister, had been marginalized by Rafsanjani, although he could not be silenced. Mohtashami still held an extreme vision of Hizballah's proper role. "US interests and its economic, security, and espionage centers in Lebanon, in the region, and in various parts of the world should be attacked, just as the criminal US has attacked the interests and centers of the Muslims in the world," urged Mohtashami. Hizballah "should extend its defense and aggression lines all over the region, into Europe, and even in the US."[127] But Tufayli denied any connection between himself and these dangerous admonitions by Mohtashami. "I was the first to receive Mohtashami in Lebanon in 1982," said Tufayli. "And I was the first to unmask him, at a time when everyone was duped by him. Our relations are therefore very bad." Tufayli, like Nasrallah, claimed that he too looked for guidance to Khamene'i.[128]

Significantly, both camps in Hizballah still felt it necessary to invoke the authority of the leader of Iran. His "blessing," and not the votes of Lebanese constituents, conferred legitimacy on the decisions of the movement. Khamene'i, like Khomeini before him, took stands open to multiple interpretations in Lebanon. But it was precisely this ambiguity that prevented factionalism from turning into fragmentation. Hizballah did not split open, and Iran remained sovereign over all.

At the same time, Iran urged Hizballah toward greater economic self-reliance, now that it had gained entry to Lebanon's political institutions. Iran was said to have cut back on funding by as much as half. Most current estimates stood at about $60m. a year. According to Nasrallah, Iran's cuts were not a political distancing, but a recognition that Hizballah could meet more of its own needs. But Tufayli saw the diminished funding as a sign that Hizballah had lost Iran's support, because it had become one more Lebanese party.[129]

After Israel's "Operation Accountability," an air and artillery punishment of South Lebanon for the guerrilla attacks of Hizballah (see chapter on Israel), Nasrallah went to Tehran to ask for additional funds. He reportedly sought to bring the Iranian subsidy back up to as much as $100m., earmarked for reconstruction. This request, coming at a moment of economic stringencies in Iran and growing criticism of foreign Islamic aid, did not go over well. Velayati and Nateq-Nuri reportedly told Nasrallah that Hizballah would have to rely on private and voluntary donations. Khamene'i made an initial contribution of $20,000 to the emergency fund, but the public response in Iran was reportedly tepid.[130] Returning empty-handed, Nasrallah now advised against exaggerating the damages done by Israel. "The destruction does not require massive amounts in order to erase the traces of aggression," he announced. Iran was ready to help, but the Lebanese state and other organizations also had to assist.[131] The message was clear: Hizballah, after over a decade of exclusive reliance on Iran, would have to lobby the Lebanese state for additional resources.

Another example of the self-help principle involved the pillar of Hizballah's social services: the care of the families of its "martyrs." Iran's Martyrs' Foundation in Lebanon had taken on this responsibility. It offered stipends and social services to 1,797 families of "martyrs," and 365 families of prisoners. There were 3,796 members in these families being supported by the foundation. It also covered the medical and pharmaceutical expenses of these families, and provided schoolbooks for children and scholarships for students. The Martyrs' Foundation now launched a program to

encourage local benefactors to "adopt" children of "martyrs." It cost about $1,000 a year to meet the needs of such a child; the benefactor would be attached to a specific child, with whom he would meet or correspond. (The child remained in his or her own family.)[132]

At the same time, the Martyrs' Foundation sought official Lebanese recognition — and subsidies — for institutions it had created during the 1980s. One example was the Imam Khomeini hospital in Ba'albak, which in the first decade of operation (1983–92) treated 1.8m. patients. It also employed 36 specialist physicians.[133] The foundation also tried to raise public subscriptions, most notably for a planned hospital in Nabatiyya in the south, named after one of Hizballah's first "martyrs," Shaykh Raghib Harb.[134]

For a decade, Iran had provided seed money for Hizballah. But now that the movement was a going concern, Iran insisted that it become partly self-sustaining. It remained to be seen whether this would translate into a growing political independence as well.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MARJA'IYYA

The supreme *marja'*, the source of emulation for some 100m. Shi'i Muslims, is by custom that Shi'i cleric who commands the unsurpassed respect of his colleagues and the trust of believers. They turn ultimately to him for guidance in the affairs of this world and the next. Ayatollah Khomeini had enjoyed this standing in Shi'i Islam until his death in 1989. So too had Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Kho'i, Khomeini's contemporary and rival, who had reigned unchallenged from 1989 until his death in 1992. Kho'i had been succeeded by Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Golpaygani, a nonagenarian and leading light in the Qom theological seminary. But given Golpaygani's advanced age and poor health, it was only a matter of time before the issue reemerged. On 9 December 1993, Golpaygani died in Qom, at the age of 96. By the time of his death, the debate over the succession was already well under way. (For more background, see *MECS* 1992, pp. 210–12.)[135]

On the face of it, this debate seemed abstract. What were the proper qualifications of a *marja'*? Should he be a figure known for his academic learning, as had been the tradition, or a person of impeccable revolutionary credentials, conforming to the new role of Shi'ism's clergy in Iranian politics? Should he be a man of the Shi'i theological academies or a man of the mosques? Should the constitutionally recognized leader of Iran be accorded the status of *marja' al-taqlid* (Persian, *marja'-e taqlid*) to prevent the fragmentation of spiritual and temporal authority? Must he reside in Iran, an Islamic state, or could he reside anywhere, even in Saddam Husayn's Ba'thist Iraq or confessional Lebanon? Could there be more than one supreme *marja'*, of varying qualifications and nationalities, meeting the needs of diverse Shi'i constituencies? These seemingly theoretical questions were not posed in a political vacuum, and every possible answer had political implications.

The choice was not obvious. At one time, the heads of the academies in Qom and Mashhad enjoyed reputations that spanned the Shi'i world, but the most famous of them had died in recent years, including Ayatollahs Seyyed Kazem Shariatmadari in 1986[47], Khomeini in 1989, Shihab al-Din Mar'ashi-Najafi in 1990, and finally Golpaygani in 1993. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, their best students had been

drawn away from the seminaries and into government. These included Ayatollah Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, successor to Khomeini in his capacity as constitutional "leader"; Hojjat ul-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, president; Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, head of the judiciary; and Hojjat ul-Islam 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, speaker of the Majlis. This brain drain left few outstanding personalities in Qom (or Mashhad) to succeed to the headship of the seminaries. The remaining clerics of the first rank included Ayatollah Shaykh Hosayn 'Ali Montazeri, who once had been Khomeini's hand-picked successor until they fell out in 1989; Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Ruhani, a Najaf-schooled cleric who always kept at arm's length from the regime; Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan Qomi-Tabataba'i, a Mashhad cleric who had done the same; and Ayatollah Shaykh Mohammad 'Ali Araki, a man one hundred years old, who only came to prominence after Khomeini's death and whose most compelling claim seemed to be his advanced years. The first three of these clerics were viewed dimly by the regime since they refused to support it, although they did not openly oppose it.

On Golpaygani's death, something like a consensus formed within the proregime clerics around Araki, as the sole senior cleric prepared to endorse the interpretations championed by Khomeini. His advanced age assured that the question of the Marja'iyya would be reopened fairly soon, but at least the facade of unity could be preserved for a few more months or years. The day after Golpaygani's death, the Qom seminary teachers declared in favor of Araki.[136]

But there were already signs that some clerics wished to put forward the name of Khamene'i. Although Khamene'i had succeeded Khomeini as "leader" of the revolution, he had not even been an ayatollah at the time of his selection. His elevation had been a political appointment by Iran's Assembly of Experts, and while he assumed the title of ayatollah, he did not command the authority of a supreme *marja'*. Nevertheless, he enjoyed the support of clerics who backed Khomeini's idea of clerical domination over government. These clerics, who had abandoned the seminaries for ministries and arrived at mosques in official limousines, saw Khamene'i as the man to emulate.[137]

A week after Golpaygani died, Iran's head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Yazdi, preached a Friday sermon arguing that piety and scholastic learning no longer sufficed in a *marja'*. The *marja'* had to be a man closely attuned to politics and economics, so that he could guide the believers. It was also important to preserve the unity of authority: The supreme *marja'* should also be the "leader" of the revolution. Yazdi went on to describe Khamene'i as "the most qualified compared to all his peers and his equals as regards his awareness of the age, managerial ability, administrative skills, and the ability to understand the issues and affairs of the time."[138] Majlis Speaker Nateq-Nuri also added his support to this endorsement of Khamene'i.[139]

This created the potential for a dangerous split within Iran's clerical elite. Ayatollah 'Ali Akbar Meshkini, speaker of Iran's Assembly of Experts, quickly issued a strong endorsement of Araki. "Grand Ayatollah Araki is definitely the present source of emulation and more senior than others. You should have no doubts about the matter." He also urged the leading clerics to create a counsel to choose a single *marja'* after Araki, for if not, "the BBC will choose one source of emulation and Radio Monte Carlo another."[140]

As the controversy threatened to break open, Khamene'i himself decided not to overbid his hand, and gingerly withdrew his candidacy. He announced that Araki, "a

sacred wealth," had been put by God "before the people for them to emulate."[141] This left the controversy temporarily on hold until God withdrew Araki, as seemed likely in the not too distant future. At that point, presumably, supporters of Khamene'i would be better positioned to make a bid for their man.

This resolved the issue for supporters of the regime, but not for its opponents. There were two other figures in Qom who also had support, both in Iran and beyond. There was Ayatollah Montazeri, who remained under house arrest, but whose followers had refused to recognize Golpaygani and rejected Araki. Montazeri also reputedly had followers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ayatollah Ruhani also had a considerable following, inside and outside Iran. A student of Kho'i, he had spent most of his career in Najaf, fleeing to Qom to escape Saddam's depredations. Like Kho'i, he was known to oppose Khomeini's notion of *velayat-e faqih,* which he interpreted only in the narrowest of senses. He had some enthusiastic adherents abroad,[142] and his people in Qom reportedly had discussed his succession with Golpaygani.[143] But at the crucial moment, Ruhani did not allow his candidacy to be put forward. It was reported that he still preferred that the supreme *marja'* be located in Najaf, although he himself had no intention of returning there so long as Saddam ruled.[144]

Among most Iranians, there was a natural assumption that the *marja' al-taqlid* should be an Iranian, and not an opponent of the regime. "It is to the benefit of Islam and the country, that our source of emulation must be in Qom," said Meshkini. "If he is elsewhere, no matter who he is, the enemy's criminal hand will take possession of him."[145] But many leading Shi'i clerics, especially outside Iran, thought otherwise. They believed that the seminaries of Najaf, the Shi'i shrine city in Iraq, enjoyed a clear preeminence over those of Qom. Most of the Najaf-schooled clerics had been students of Kho'i, and they could be found across the Shi'i world. Drawn from many nationalities, they had their own tradition of scholarship and activism, which had always resisted state control.

Najaf was removed from the manipulations of Iran, but it was also under the grinding thumb of Saddam Husayn, who had tried to intervene in the matter of the Marja'iyya upon Kho'i's death in 1992. At that time, he had coerced the heads of some of the Najaf academies to acclaim Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr as *marja'*. Sadr had only one real credential: a willingness to bend before Saddam. But this appointment bound no one in the Shi'i world, and many Shi'is attacked it as gross intervention.[146] Those who favored a restoration of Najaf to its former glory looked to other candidates.

Among the leading Najaf-based clerics were Ayatollahs 'Abd al-A'la Sabzevari (who died in August),[147] Seyyed 'Ali al-Sistani, Seyyed 'Ali Beheshti, Seyyed 'Ala al-Din Bahr al-'Ulum, and Seyyed Muhammad Reza Khalkhali. Of Kho'i's surviving students in Najaf at the time of Golpaygani's death, Sistani enjoyed a clear preeminence, and had the lion's share of support among clerics who wanted to restore Najaf to its place of honor in Shi'i Islam. At the age of 62, he also represented the young blood among Najaf's candidates. His following was said to be constantly expanding, and he had opened offices in Mashhad and Qom to handle the affairs of his followers outside Iraq. Sistani's supporters had accepted Golpaygani upon Kho'i's death, but argued that after Golpaygani's death, Sistani represented the obvious choice.

Upon Golpaygani's death, some important clerics did declare for Sistani. Perhaps his most valuable support came from Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlal-

lah, oracle of Hizballah in Lebanon and a major scholar in his own right. Before Golpaygani's death, Fadlallah had described the Marja'iyya as a choice between Araki in Qom and Sistani in Najaf. But Fadlallah judged Araki's following to be limited to Iran, and he declared Najaf to be the "basic center" of Shi'i Islam. Najaf left a more indelible imprint on its graduates than Qom, which he described as distinctly second-rate.[148] Then, in his first Friday prayer after Golpaygani's death, Fadlallah openly opted for Sistani.[149] In this manner, Fadlallah clearly broke with the proregime consensus in Iran, reasserted the primacy of Najaf over Qom, and declared his own independence from Iranian guidance.[150] (However, this did not bind Hizballah. To the contrary: Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hizballah, declared his support for Araki, in order to demonstrate the movement's fealty to Iran.)[151] Another source of support for Sistani was the Imam Kho'i Institute, a worldwide institution founded by Kho'i, to which many millions of Shi'is still looked for guidance. As Golpaygani's health deteriorated, Kho'i's grandson indicated that the institute would endorse Sistani upon Golpaygani's death.[152]

By the year's end, authority in Shi'ism had been fragmented by the demise of the last grand ayatollahs, and seemed destined for further fragmentation. This splitting took place precisely along the familiar fault lines of Shi'ism. It divided those who supported Khomeini's radical demand for clerical power from those who adhered to the traditional view of a clergy above politics. It separated the two distinct styles of activism identified with Qom and Najaf. To some extent, it separated Persians from Arabs. The debate over the Marja'iyya demonstrated the difficulties of uniting around a single vision of Islam, even for the one-tenth of all Muslims who were Shi'is.

ISLAM VS. THE WEST

On 26 February, a rented van exploded in a basement parking garage of the World Trade Center in New York. The force of the tremendous blast brought down several stories of the garage, filled the building with smoke, and required its emergency evacuation. Six persons died, and over 1,000 were injured. Damage totaled half a billion dollars, in the costliest act of terror ever carried out on American shores. The trail led back to a network of Islamic activism.

On 4 March, police arrested their first suspect in the bombing: Muhammad Salama, a West Bank-born Palestinian of Jordanian nationality who had rented the van. Salama was an ardent Islamist and a member of an Islamist subculture centered around mosques in New York and New Jersey. "Here I have come across more Arabs and Muslims than if I had stayed back home!" he said in a prison interview. "My interchange with these fellow Muslims has been a most important educational experience."[153] This proved true enough when US authorities arrested two more Palestinians and two Egyptians for the bombing. One Iraqi was indicted in absentia. On 24 June, the window on this world opened wider, when US authorities apprehended five Sudanese, two Americans, and a Palestinian from Jordan. They were charged with conspiring to launch additional bomb attacks against two traffic tunnels, the UN building and a federal building in Manhattan.[154]

Key suspects in both cases served as confidants and translators for Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, a blind Egyptian preacher who had been tried (and acquitted) on charges stemming from the 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat.[155] Since 1990,

Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman had made the US his base for preaching against the Egyptian Government and in favor of an Islamic state in Egypt. On 2 July, after much hesitation, the US authorities arrested Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman on immigration charges. Negotiations began over his possible extradition to Egypt or his deportation to another country.

But this proved to be a prelude to a later indictment, issued on 25 August, charging him with masterminding an overall conspiracy involving the World Trade Center bombing, the foiled bomb plots, and a conspiracy to murder Egyptian President Husni Mubarak. The grand jury indictment named Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman as "a leader of the organization, with whom others consulted in pursuing and planning bombings, murders, and acts of terrorism."[156] The prosecution later prepared a 100-page memorandum, arguing that "the crimes and acts alleged in the indictment are not random, disconnected acts." They were coordinated by a "Jihad organization" that "set up headquarters in various American cities in New York, New Jersey, Texas, California, Michigan and elsewhere." This organization "had ties to Jihad organizations in Egypt, the Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere."[157] The precise degree of responsibility for its acts would be determined in a series of trials, the first of which involved the alleged plotters in the World Trade Center bombing, and which opened in New York on 4 October.

The arrests and trials which began with the World Trade Center bombing raised broader questions about the geopolitics of Islam. Had the Islamist war against the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan during the 1980s created a floating army of extremists, who coordinated their efforts across the borders of the ME? And to what extent had the the US, and indeed the West, become a safe haven and rear base for Islamist movements in the ME? The World Trade Center bombing and aftermath did not generate enough evidence to answer either question definitively, but a clearer picture began to emerge. (For other aspects of the episode, see chapter on Egypt.)[158]

THE "AFGHAN ARABS"

One of the most intriguing common denominators among some of the Arab defendants was their past service in the Afghan Jihad, operating from bases in Pakistan (for background on the Afghan Arabs, see *MECS* 1992, pp. 196–98). Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman had made several trips to Pakistan before coming to the US. He spent up to two months there in 1988, and up to six months in 1990, on both occasions as a guest of Hikmatyar's faction. Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman was reputedly close to 'Abdallah 'Azzam, the Jordanian-born Palestinian who ran the largest recruitment operation for Arab volunteers for the war, located in the Pakistani frontier town of Peshawar. (One of Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman's sons served as a volunteer.) The shaykh was also accompanied on his first visit by the brother of Sadat's assassin, who remained in Pakistan and looked after the blind shaykh on his subsequent trip. The shaykh arrived in the US in July 1990 at the invitation of Mustafa Shalabi, an Egyptian who in 1986 founded the Alkifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, which raised funds and recruits for 'Azzam. (Shalabi's murder in March 1991 remained an unsolved case.)[159]

The Afghan connection extended to other defendants. Mahmud Abu Halima, an Egyptian defendant, visited Afghanistan several times, probably carrying money from the Refugee Center.[160] Another defendant, an American Muslim named Clement Rodney Hampton-El (also known as 'Abd al-Rashid 'Abdallah), had fought with

Hikmatyar's forces and had been wounded in Afghanistan. "I want to recover and go back to Afghanistan to achieve enlightenment and then die while striving," he told an anthropologist in 1989.[161] Another suspect, Ahmad 'Ajaj, had also traveled to Afghanistan, "to purify my soul." He had arrived in the US straight from Pakistan, with a quantity of bomb-making manuals.[162] The American FBI estimated that there were about 200 such veterans of the Afghan war in New York and New Jersey.[163]

Their presence in the US was not an anomaly. The American CIA had provided funds and weapons to the Afghan Mujahidin, and especially for Hikmatyar's faction. Although Saudi Arabia and Pakistan handled recruitment and logistics, Arab Muslims were regularly admitted to the US to raise funds and recruits for the Jihad. What the US had failed to realize was that this partnership had ended. One former CIA official put it this way: "The partnership, if you will, between the United States and the Afghan resistance was of limited duration and could only have been so. The long-range aims of a country in which Islamists were at least beginning to have a say would not be, could not be, wholly compatible with the aims of a Western nation. The primary goal of Islamism is to get rid of, or at least lessen, Western influence."[164] The World Trade Center case dramatized the problem posed by the returning Arab volunteers of that war.[165]

The Egyptian Islamist Fahmi Huwaydi pondered the radical reversal in the image of the Afghan Arabs, especially after the World Trade Center bombing. "Not very many months ago, these people were Mujahidin, celebrated everywhere." Now they "have turned into suspects and defendants and their Jihad journey has become evidence proving the charge against them, justifying the inclusion of their names in airport blacklists."[166] And they were turning up increasingly at airports. By late 1992, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria were pressuring the government of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to shut down the camps of Afghan Arabs on Pakistani soil. Pakistani authorities announced that they had made a list of 2,800 Arabs in the area.[167] Some 1,500 were said to be Egyptians, and Egypt pressed for their extradition, although no extradition treaty existed between Egypt and Pakistan.[168] The US also began to hint that Pakistan would find itself on the terrorism list for, among other reasons, sheltering the Afghan Arabs.[169]

In January, Pakistan ordered all Arab organizations operating in Peshawar to close down, but it did not enforce this measure. Many of the Afghan Arabs had no place to go, since they had fled prosecution in their own countries. From 6 April, Pakistani police launched a demonstrative crackdown, arresting from 300 to 700 Arabs who had overstayed visas or were present in the country illegally. They were of Egyptian, Algerian, Libyan, Sudanese, Jordanian, Saudi, Yemeni, Tunisian and Gulf nationality. They were photographed, and their photographs were sent to embassies in Islamabad to determine if any of them were wanted. Others were simply told to leave, and a special court was set up to expedite deportations. Some who could return safely home agreed to do so, and left for Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. At the end of the month, the head of the Pakistani caretaker government told an ICO foreign ministers' conference that Pakistan had "urged" foreign nationals to go home, "as their presence in our country is no longer needed. Pakistan cannot allow its territory to be used for any undesirable activities against any other state."[170]

Despite the arrests, over 2,000 Arabs reportedly remained in Peshawar. When Benazir Bhutto was elected Pakistan's prime minister in October, she launched an

effort to remove the last of them, mostly Egyptians and Libyans, who were working for some 30 Peshawar-based aid organizations. A special four-man committee, headed by a former general, was set up to prepare a plan "to root out elements involved in activities hostile to Pakistan's interests." The committee considered three measures: nonrenewal of residence and work permits, examination of financial records of charity organizations, and straightforward insistence that aid groups move to the Afghan capital of Kabul.[171]

Under this pressure, some Afghan Arabs did move into Afghanistan itself, either to Jalalabad or Kabul, largely in the encampments of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar or 'Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf. Arabs were sighted at both their headquarters. An Algerian fighting for Hikmatyar put it this way: "King Fahd has said that the Jihad in Afghanistan is over," but there were "other Saudi 'Ulama and shaykhs who say it is still necessary to fight, because the regime in Kabul is not at all Islamic." Some Afghan Arabs also moved northward in Afghanistan, toward Tajikistan. Qazi Husayn Ahmad, leader of *Jama'ate Islami* in Pakistan, spoke of about 1,000 Arabs in Afghanistan. Arab diplomats put the figure as high as 6,000.[172]

At first, the provisional Afghan Government saw no problem with admitting the Arabs. Afghan Foreign Minister Hidayat Amin Arsala explained Afghan policy on the Egyptians (and others): "So far I have not been given any evidence that these people have acted outside Afghanistan or have given instructions to those outside Afghanistan. If in time it becomes a problem with countries in the Islamic world like Egypt, we will have to consider what we will do."[173] But it did become a problem. In January, Afghanistan dispatched its minister of information to Cairo, to explain Afghan policy. "I was startled when I read Egyptian newspapers that lumped us with Iran and Sudan as countries that encourage terrorism and extremism," he said.[174] Egypt kept up pressure on Afghanistan, and when Afghan President Rabbani visited Egypt in November, he assured Egyptian President Husni Mubarak that Afghanistan would not allow anyone "plotting against the security of Egypt to seek refuge on Afghan soil."[175]

Rabbani, however, did not control all Afghan soil. Hikmatyar sent very different signals. He was prepared to take in the Afghan Arabs, according to a statement issued by his office in Peshawar urging them to join his principal headquarters near Kabul.[176] "These elements are very few in number, spread throughout Afghanistan, and do not pose a threat to their countries," he insisted.[177] Hikmatyar was also prepared to give shelter to Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman, if he needed it: "I do not see any objection to his coming to live in Afghanistan as an immigrant."[178]

Another obvious avenue of escape closed: Sudan. Under its Islamist regime, Sudan had a policy of freely admitting all Arabs to the country. But in April, Sudan's foreign minister said it would not take in the Afghan Arabs. "The policy of open doors to all the Arabs which the Sudanese Government announced, will be reviewed. Before we decide to accept any one of the Arabs in Pakistan, we will investigate him and his past, lest we have difficulties later."[179] Sudan apparently did not want to open itself to the charge of harboring subversives and terrorists. At year's end, the leader of Sudan's Islamists, Hasan al-Turabi, visited Afghanistan and Pakistan, to try to mediate a settlement between warring Mujahidin factions (see below). He also reportedly sought to deal with the question of the remaining Afghan Arabs, trying to find a home for them elsewhere since Sudan could not admit them. According to one report, he

proposed to Hizballah's secretary-general, Nasrallah, that the Afghan Arabs be sent to Lebanon on Sudanese or Iranian passports and be added to Hizballah's ranks. But Hizballah, in the midst of a campaign to cast itself as a legitimate political party, reportedly wanted nothing to do with the scheme.[180]

There was ample evidence that those who could not stay in Pakistan, could not return home, and did not wish to join Afghanistan's factional fighting, began to head toward Europe and America. According to one rumor, France had recruited 200 Afghan Arabs, some of whom had landed in France and Germany, to a unit of the French Foreign Legion. It was reasoned that they could be used for delicate interventions in Islamic countries, and that their recruitment would keep them from involvement in unrest. They were being trained in Corsica.[181] This led the Egyptian Islamist Huwaydi to ask whether "there is no way to employ the religious and Jihad capabilities of these young men to serve one of our nation's noble goals."[182] But it was doubtful that they could be reliably put to any other use than waging Jihad for an Islamic state — precisely the reason no border in the ME was opened before them. Toward the end of the year, it was reported that Pakistani authorities were reconsidering the policy of deportations.[183]

ISLAMISTS IN THE WEST

The World Trade Center case also demonstrated that many Islamists had found safe haven in the West. Islamists argued that Western policy was based on the demonization of Islam, and that the West was united in seeking to prevent the creation of a Muslim state (Bosnia) in Europe. But as Islamists came under growing pressure at home, they increasingly sought a protected platform in the West. This was a tradition that spanned a century, as demonstrated by the peregrinations in Europe of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the 1880s and of Shakib Arslan between the world wars. Since the 1950s, refugee Islamists could rely on the support of substantial Muslim immigrant communities in the West. This is precisely what had happened in the case of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman. In 1993, the movement of Islamists to the major countries of the West intensified. While their reception there varied widely, they generally enjoyed the freedom of expression denied them at home.

The United States

The US, the sole great power, abhorred by Islamists, continued to receive them as immigrants. Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman's own case demonstrated the ease of entry into the US, eliciting much American soul-searching over immigration procedures.[184] Other Islamists were also active in the US, although the precise nature of their activities remained a matter of controversy.

During the year, Israeli press reports spotlighted pro-Hamas activity in the US. The most far-reaching claim asserted that Hamas received instructions directly from a nebulous headquarters somewhere in the US.[185] As if to confirm this claim, Israel arrested three Arab-Americans who visited the West Bank after the December 1992 deportation of Hamas activists in December. They brought large sums of money with them, and were accused of trying to reconstruct the Hamas infrastructure, supposedly damaged by the deportations.[186]

But Israeli military authorities dismissed the idea of a US-based command for

Hamas as "totally unfounded" and "completely ludicrous." Hamas was run from the West Bank and Gaza.[187] As one well-informed Israeli journalist pointed out, Hamas was more home-grown than any Palestinian movement. None of those arrested and tried by Israel over the years reported being recruited in Amman, Damascus or Tehran. None of them were trained abroad, as was the rule with the PLO. They joined in Gaza and the West Bank, and did not receive orders from foreign headquarters. Almost all of them were born and raised in the territories, and few had ever left them, except to work in Israel. Their weapons were mostly Israeli army-issue: rifles and pistols seized or stolen from Israeli soldiers, or bought in the Israeli underworld.[188]

US State Department officials also maintained that Hamas activity in the US was limited to moral support and fund-raising. "We're trying to steer people away from allegations that terrorist operations of Hamas are in the US on an operational level."[189] The FBI did step up its investigation of Hamas fund-raising, and monitored groups in several major US cities. But a US official said that this fund-raising involved "a very small amount of money, and a very small number of people."[190] Still, investigative reporting uncovered the existence of a support network for Hamas in the US, operating within the law. Most of its activities involved publishing and fund-raising.[191]

The Algerian FIS also had an outpost in the US, around Anwar Khaddam in Chicago. A nuclear physicist educated at Princeton, Khaddam had been a successful FIS candidate in the parliamentary elections of 1991, who was denied his seat when the regime canceled the election results. Khaddam represented the FIS "parliamentary committee" abroad, comprised of FIS candidates who, like him, had won seats in the abrogated elections. Khaddam reportedly had contacts with US officials, and he spoke during the summer at the European Parliament.[192]

France

France had been a traditional haven for Islamists in the past, especially those from North Africa. But France took a comparatively hard line toward newer attempts to expand Islamist networks on its soil. This stand grew even firmer after the election of a right-wing government in March, as demonstrated in a series of statements by new French ministers. Jacques Toubon, the culture minister, announced after a visit to Tunisia that the French Government had "no intention of letting fundamentalist cells, which are dangerous for us and for others, develop in France."[193] French Defense Minister François Léotard, on a visit to Tunisia, called Islamic fundamentalism "a dangerous development which has to be fought everywhere, not only in Algeria."[194]

On 8 November, France arrested 88 FIS supporters in France. These included Djaafar El Houari, president of the FIS front organization, the *Fraternité Algérienne en France* (FAF). Its publication had been banned during the summer, at the request of the Algerian Foreign Ministry. El Houari defended the right of the FIS to propagandize in France: "The militants who live on French soil are doing so legally. Most of them came to France before the putsch. They are also studying or working legally. None of them, to the best of my knowledge, obtained political asylum, although we are all refugees."[195] "I have never called on anyone to attack French interests, the French, or France," he protested.[196] In the end, all those detained were released, but the message to the FIS was clear.

About 15 senior members of the banned Tunisian movement, the Nahda Party, were resident in France. They did not have political asylum, and they were under police surveillance, but they remained in touch with the movement in Tunisia. The Tunisian Government demanded that their activities stop or, better still, that they be deported to Tunisia. In January, Tunisian Interior Minister Abdallilah Qilal visited Paris with just the purpose of persuading France to act. On 30 October, France issued an expulsion order against a leading Nahda activist, Salah Karkar, and put him under house arrest pending an appeal. On 8 December, French police raided the homes of a dozen supporters of the Nahda Party, at the request of a Tunisian judge who asked France to check the identity of persons suspected of planning or perpetrating terror attacks.

Britain

Britain was host to Rashid al-Ghannushi, the leader of the banned Nahda. Ghannushi had been excluded from Tunisia during one of his trips abroad in 1989, after his criticism of the parliamentary elections of that year, which gave all seats to the ruling party. He spent some time in France, but Tunisian pressure on Paris forced him to leave. He also spent time in Algeria and Sudan. Ghannushi finally arrived in the UK in November 1991, and asked for political asylum. In August 1992, a Tunisian court sentenced him in absentia to life imprisonment for attempting to overthrow the government. Tunisia then attempted to block his bid for political asylum.[197] The Tunisian Embassy in London also conducted a campaign against him, writing to newspapers that published interviews with him.[198] But the Tunisian Government's effort was weakened by reports of its human rights violations, and members of the Muslim community in the UK also took up Ghannushi's cause. He received asylum in August 1993. "We Islamists may have a lot of criticism of Western values," said Ghannushi, "yet we are seeking refuge in such atheist countries because we appreciate the benefits of freedom and the value of democracy."[199]

The terms of Ghannushi's asylum limited his political activity, but his presence in the UK gave him access to other Islamists. For example, in October he met with a Hizballah parliamentary delegation that visited the UK.[200] In December he delivered the keynote address to the conference of the Muslim Students Society in the UK, which was also attended by the deputy guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mustafa Mashhur.[201] From the UK, he also sought to represent Islamism before US opinion, sending missives to a high US official on Islamism's willingness for dialogue with the West.[202] Ghannushi thus came to rival the Iranian-backed Kalim Siddiqui for the position of the most outspoken Islamist based in the UK (on Siddiqui, see *MECS* 1992, pp. 209–10).

Germany

Rabah Kebir, an Algerian physics professor and FIS activist, found refuge in Germany. He had been arrested in Algeria in the February 1992 crackdown, and then was released from prison and put under house arrest. He mediated contacts between the regime and detained FIS leader 'Abbasi Madani. But when Madani was tried and convicted, Kebir decided to escape. He slipped out of Algeria in September 1992, making his way to Spain, France, and finally Germany, with his wife and five

children. "I feel safer here than in France," he explained.[203] Algeria demanded the extradition of Kebir for his alleged involvement in the bombing of the Algiers airport in August 1992, in which nine persons died. Algeria even put out an international warrant for his arrest. Germany did arrest him in June 1993, but the German prosecutor's office demanded that Algeria provide proof beyond reasonable doubt of Kebir's involvement in the bombing. Kebir was defended by the French lawyer Jacques Verges, known for taking controversial cases (most notably, his defense of Klaus Barbie).[204] Kebir was released in September, after Algeria failed to produce proof of his involvement in the airport bombing. That same month, Kebir was named head of the FIS executive committee abroad, in which capacity he gave frequent interviews to the international media.[205]

Switzerland

The Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the reorganized Jihad faction known as the Vanguards of the Conquest (*Tala'i' al-Fath*), found refuge in Switzerland. A physician, he belonged to the original Jihad group established in the 1960s. He went to Afghanistan in 1980, returned to Egypt, and was arrested after Sadat's assassination in 1981. Released in 1984, he left Egypt in 1985, ultimately arriving in Peshawar where he worked as a surgeon, treating Afghan war wounded and refugees. There he assumed leadership of the Jihad group. During 1993, Egypt sought his extradition in connection with the largest state security case ever, involving 823 defendants. The group was deemed responsible for numerous bombings in Cairo during the year, and the failed attempt on the life of Interior Minister Maj.-Gen. Hasan al-Alfi (see chapter on Egypt).[206] Zawahiri fled Pakistan after its decision to deport Afghan Arabs (see above), and passed through several countries, including Sudan, before settling in Switzerland in October.[207]

The flight of Islamist leaders to the West demonstrated that the tide in many countries of the ME and North Africa had turned against them. The exiled Islamists did not yet coordinate their action. Their first priority was to regularize their status in Western countries. But it seemed likely that they would use their new freedom of expression and movement to meet and work together to seek an exit from their impasse.

ISLAM AND PALESTINE

While Muslim opinion united over Bosnia, where war grew crueller, it divided over Palestine, where peace grew nearer. In secret negotiations, Israel and the PLO concluded a Declaration of Principles, based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Palestinian self-rule (see chapter on the ME peace process). In the prevailing climate, many Muslims raised the question of the Islamic admissibility of this agreement.

The Islamic establishments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia sanctioned the accord. Shaykh al-Azhar Jad al-Haqq endorsed the accord by citing the Qur'an: "If the enemy inclines toward peace, do thou also incline toward peace, and trust in God."[208] Shaykh Ibn Baz, head of the Saudi religious establishment, issued a ruling allowing that peace with Israel would be legitimate "if it is useful to the Muslims and permits the Palestinians to establish their state, delivering them from harm and oppression." In

support of his position, he cited the truce concluded between Muhammad and the pagans of Mecca. "Were the pagans not greater evildoers than the Jews, these People of the Book to whom the Prophet accorded protection?"[209] PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat also received a Shi'i endorsement directly from Ayatollah Mahdi Ruhani, the most outspoken and prominent Shi'i authority in Europe.[210]

Islamist opposition figures took the opposite view. All of the Palestinian Islamist organizations — first and foremost, Hamas — published severe condemnations of the agreement.[211] The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan also denounced the accord. "This agreement represents total injustice," said the Egyptian statement. "Injustice will not last."[212] This was the line followed by all the mainstream Sunni movements of the Muslim Brotherhood variety, in Pakistan, Kuwait and the Gulf.[213] Iran and its Lebanese ally, Hizballah, also denounced the agreement, relying on the verdict of Khamene'i, who called on the Islamic world to launch a "counterattack" against the accord.[214]

'Arafat, who himself had old ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, tried to bring about a reconsideration, complaining to its leader that the movement had reacted without consulting the PLO first. On 19 September, 'Arafat visited the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, where he met with the deputy general guide, Mustafa Mashhur. According to Mashhur, 'Arafat asked the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to persuade Hamas to cooperate with the PLO. Mashhur replied that the Muslim Brotherhood issued only general guidance to Hamas and all Muslims. This guidance stressed that Palestine was not a Palestinian problem but an Islamic one. No one had any right to compromise over any part of Palestine.[215] This remained the widespread declaratory position of all Islamists, both Sunni and Shi'i.

THE STRUGGLE OF HAMAS

But would these many Islamist opponents of the accord take any action to back up their declarations? Their words should have translated into much wider support for the Hamas movement in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas, the Islamist force in the best position to undermine the accord, avidly sought political and financial support from Muslim sympathizers abroad. It met with mixed success.

A Palestinian student of Hamas indicated that the movement received financial support from many sources. They included Muslim supporters in Islamic countries, Europe and America; other Islamic movements; sympathetic states, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf shaykhdoms, as well as Iran; the PLO (on at least one occasion); and various enterprises owned by Hamas.[216] Ibrahim Ghawsha, spokesman of Hamas in Jordan, said that the movement subsisted on minimum funds: "The movement does not have a bureaucracy, big expenditure, and big offices that need big spending. We manage, using minimum funds."[217] But particular attention was focused during the year on support from Iran and Saudi Arabia.[218]

A Hamas-Iran understanding had been reached during a series of high-level contacts in 1992 (see *MECS* 1992, pp. 204–5). Reports continued to circulate about an Iranian offer of $30m. of aid to Hamas, a television station based in Lebanon, and Iranian guerrilla training for 3,000 Hamas activists. The head of the political bureau of Hamas, Musa Abu Marzuq, denied that Hamas received any such sum, and pointed out that it was logistically impossible for Iran to train Hamas activists.[219] Other

reports said Iran had not promised a television station, but offered to see if a television signal could be beamed from Iran, which was too far away.[220]

In December, Abu Marzuq and Ghawsha paid a visit to Tehran. There they met with Khamene'i, Rafsanjani, Nateq-Nuri and Velayati. Ghawsha indicated that the visitors found the stand of Iran "very close" to that of Hamas on the Israeli-PLO accord. But the backing offered by Iran was "limited popular support. You cannot compare it to the billions that the PLO receives."[221] It was also significant that Iran chose not to reconvene the rejectionist conference it had assembled after the Madrid conference (see *MECS* 1991, pp. 195–97). A source close to the Iranian Foreign Ministry explained that Iran believed that the Israeli-PLO accord would collapse anyway, and did not want to become the scapegoat for that failure.[222] Iran's ally, Hizballah, also condemned the accord but refused to take responsibility for the struggle against it. The movement's secretary-general, Nasrallah, said that 'Arafat "wasted in one moment all the martyrdom that has taken place over 45 years." But the liberation of Palestine "is the responsibility of the Palestinian people. When Israel occupied Lebanon, we did not ask anyone to come and fight on our behalf. And nobody can fight for an end to the occupation of Palestinian land other than the Palestinian people who resist inside Palestine."[223]

Hamas also mobilized support in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, despite the fact that their governments supported the peace process. Hamas, like many other Islamic movements, had always relied on wealthy donors of Islamic conscience in the oil-producing states of the Gulf. But Hamas, unlike many of those movements, had hedged its bets during the last Gulf War, by expressing sympathy with the Kuwaiti people (see *MECS* 1991, p. 177). Hamas now reaped the reward. Ghawsha listed the movement's backers in this order: "Hamas receives modest support from many Muslims in the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Yemen, Turkey, and many others."[224]

There was no doubt who gave the most. The fund-raising techniques of Hamas in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf seemed to rest partly upon stirring fears that an Arab-Israeli peace would bring a Jewish influx into Arabia. In the seventh century, the Jews had inhabited the oasis of Khaybar near Medina, where they intrigued against the Prophet Muhammad. He imposed stiff terms on these Jews after his conquest of Khaybar, and a later caliph expelled them altogether. But according to Ghawsha, "the Jews are planning to return to Khaybar. Actually, by this accord, they will go there. They will go back peacefully. They will ask for the houses of their grandfathers."[225] This dreadful scenario apparently worked on the apprehensions of a few wealthy Saudis. At one point, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin even asked the US to intervene with Saudi Arabia and prevent Saudi donations to Hamas.[226]

Hamas did not see any contradiction in taking money from Saudis and Iranians. "We talk about Islam," said Ghawsha. "You know the Iranians are Shi'is and the Saudis are Sunnis or Wahhabis. But you know both of them have one Qur'an, one Islam. They both believe that Jerusalem, especially al-Aqsa, is the place where Muhammad was."[227] Ghawsha also noted that ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran had improved in recent years, and that Saudi Arabia operated the largest embassy in Tehran.[228] Hamas was able to draw from both these wells, but in limited quantities.

In the rest of the ME, Hamas had one guiding principle: to avoid interference in the domestic politics of other countries. It was thus able to maintain offices in states as

diverse in attitudes to their own Islamic movements as Sudan, Syria and Jordan. This was not always easy, since Hamas saw itself as a branch of the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood. Other branches were locked in confrontations with regimes, creating pressure on Hamas to take their side. Thus, when a delegation of Muslim Brotherhood lawyers from Egypt visited the Hamas deportees in Lebanon, the spokesman of the deportees, Gazan physician 'Abd al-'Aziz Rantisi, obliged them by criticizing the Egyptian Government's role in the deportation crisis. The progovernment Egyptian press immediately launched an attack on Rantisi for his ingratitude.[229] Later, Ghawsha made amends to Egypt, condemning "terrorist actions" in Egypt, and calling Egypt an example to other countries in its array of parliament and parties.[230]

During the year, some in Hamas advocated changing the movement's covenant, to eliminate the reference to Hamas being part of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to one advocate of this change, who preferred to remain anonymous, Hamas remained "indebted" to the Muslim Brotherhood. But Hamas made its own decisions, and did not see "why it should involve itself in the Brotherhood's differences with certain regimes."[231] In the end, Hamas did not change its covenant. An Israeli peace group that visited Hamas spokesman Mahmud al-Zahhar in Gaza heard him emphasize that Hamas was part of the worldwide movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, with deep historical roots and supporters throughout the ME.[232] But Hamas spokesmen were careful not to alienate any sitting regime. In this respect, Hamas differed clearly from the rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad. "Hamas has nothing against dialogue with any Arab regime or the PLO," complained a spokesman of Islamic Jihad.[233]

This dialogue carried a cost. Although other Islamists rejected the Israeli-PLO accord, they did not place the struggle against it, or support of Hamas, at the top of their own agendas. They seemed to assume that the accord would collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. Islamists elsewhere could do little to hasten that day, and were justified in concentrating all their efforts on their own survival. Ghawsha bitterly complained about the prevalence of this attitude:

> Unfortunately, the level of response and action of the world Islamic movement has been low and unacceptable. We fear that some defeatists from within have infiltrated the Islamic scene, beneath the talk of "flexibility" and "bending in the wind." We fear this will lead to acquiescence in the recognition [of Israel] and the signing [of peace], rendering the fulfillment of the Islamic plan so much pompous talk, and leaving the Islamic movement in Palestine to be massacred by 'Arafat and Rabin. If the Islamic movement does not rise in complete revolt everywhere, it will be responsible before God and history for the ruin of Palestine and Jerusalem.[234]

But the Islamic movement did not give any indication it would rise in "complete revolt" anywhere for the sake of Palestine. By year's end, Hamas would experience disappointment when the "world Islamic movement," such as it was, refused to "condemn" the Israeli-PLO accord at a conference in Khartoum (see below). And as the prospect of PLO rule grew closer, Hamas itself become more preoccupied with survival than with liberation. (For more on Hamas and the accord, see chapters on the West Bank and Gaza and on Hamas.)

THE ROLE OF SUDAN

In the Sunni world, the Islamists ruled only one country. Sudan under the Islamists had emerged as a major contestant for the role of model, guide, and supporter of Islamic movements elsewhere. At the same time, the governments of Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria charged Sudan with fomenting domestic unrest in their own countries. Sudan denied the charges. But the ubiquitous leader of Sudan's Islamic movement, Hasan al-Turabi, busied himself with so many Islamic mediations and conferences that he began to loom as a one-man Islamintern (on the Islamic role of Sudan see *MECS* 1991, pp. 182–85; 1992, pp. 198–202).[235]

The existence of secret training camps for foreign Islamists continued to figure in rumors and reports emanating from inside and outside Sudan. Fact was difficult to sort from fiction, and statements from Sudanese leaders did not clarify the picture. "We do not care much about borders," Turabi said during the year. "Indeed, we do not believe in borders among Muslim countries."[236] Yet he made the contrary claim that Sudan did not shelter foreign Islamists, and that Sudan did not seek "anything except its own development."[237] In August, the US placed Sudan on the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism, especially citing its role as a sanctuary for Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Abu Nidal. A US State Department spokesperson also indicated that "we believe that reports of training in Sudan of militant extremists who commit acts of terrorism in neighboring countries are credible."[238] A Sudanese minister replied that there was a disagreement with the US over what constituted terrorism. "We do not consider the Islamic movements in some states, like Hamas, terrorists. And the US cannot deny that Hizballah contested the elections in Lebanon and won seats."[239] Whether foreign Islamists did or did not receive training in Sudan remained an open question. But one way or another, Sudan acted as an Islamist meeting house, clearing house and transit lounge, all revolving around the person of Hasan al-Turabi.

TURABI'S DIALOGUES

"I do not render service only to Sudan," boasted Hasan al-Turabi. "Rather, I direct my movement toward and interact with the worldwide Islamic movement."[240] Turabi saw himself as the preeminent spokesman and mediator of this "worldwide" movement. He described his role precisely in one interview. "There are different leaders for different movements in different countries which have their specific problems," he explained. But unlike them, Turabi traveled widely, wrote and spoke in many languages, and attended conferences around the globe. "I am not a pope," he was quick to add. "In Islam we do not have a church. I am more the person who prompts others to start thinking."[241]

As always, his message remained an amalgam of contradictory elements. As one observer put it, "there are two Turabis. There is the one who criticizes the excesses of the Iranian revolution, speaks of the liberation of women, and extends his hand to the West. And there is the one who consults with Afghan Islamists, helps [Rashid] al-Ghannushi the Tunisian, [Shaykh 'Abd al-Majid] al-Zindani the Yemenite, Shaykh 'Umar ['Abd al-Rahman] the Egyptian and the leaders-in-exile of the Algerian FIS in their struggle for power. Discourse and reality: Each one chooses his own Turabi."[242]

Turabi demonstrated his versatility through at least three prominent mediation

roles on behalf of Islamist movements elsewhere. One Arab journalist noted wryly that it was ironic that Turabi should present himself as a promoter of dialogue, when he refused to open any dialogue between himself and his rival, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, or between the Sudanese Government and its opponents.[243] But Sudan had no need of dialogue at home, because the Islamists ruled there. Turabi mediated elsewhere precisely in order to bring Islam closer to power.

First, Turabi mediated between the PLO and Hamas. Turabi had long-standing ties with 'Arafat and Hamas, and the protocols of the meetings, which were leaked, showed him playing an active role in the talks.[244] Significantly, Turabi skirted any clear statement of his own view of the PLO's talks with Israel. Some of his statements implied support for the PLO's decision and recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 242. But Turabi simultaneously denied offering any such recognition; he had talked about accommodation with the Jews, not Israel. "I said that we do not want to build our societies against Jews, Christians, or others," but the negotiations with Israel were "not for peace, but for capitulation."[245] This verbal maneuvering may have preserved Turabi's credibility as a mediator, but he failed to bring the PLO and Hamas appreciably closer.

Second, Turabi tried to act as mediator on behalf of the Algerian FIS. He had excellent ties with Qamar al-Din Kherbane and 'Abdallah Anas, two exiled veterans of Afghanistan who championed the option of armed struggle within the FIS. Both of them had been expelled from France in the summer of 1992, and had since been sighted in Islamabad, Kabul, Khartoum, Sarajevo, Baghdad, and Tehran.[246] Turabi claimed that he sought to moderate the FIS, and create the basis for an understanding between the FIS and its opponents. The FIS, he said, was "a passionate movement without a precise program and is not yet structured. The first line is harsh. The second line is intelligent. After two years of discussion, I have been able to persuade them to talk with France and the FLN. Serious contacts have taken place in Germany, the US, and Sudan. The civil war [in Algeria] is a bad fever which must be brought down at all costs."[247] Turabi was also reported to have mediated between rival wings of the Algerian Islamic movement, at odds over the question of dialogue with the regime.[248] If something came of this mediation, it was not immediately apparent.

Third, Turabi sought to mediate an end to the civil war between factions loyal to Afghan Prime Minister Hikmatyar and President Rabbani. Their militias resumed a fierce battle for Kabul after the failure of an agreement mediated by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan early in the year (see above). Turabi appeared in Pakistan and Afghanistan in November. He spent two days in the war-torn Afghan capital, meeting with Rabbani, Hikmatyar, and the leaders of lesser factions. Turabi waxed optimistic about his formula for an agreement. "I might return individually or with a delegation to Afghanistan to complete the draft solution," he announced.[249] But nothing came of this mediation either.

Despite the ineffectiveness of all these mediations, Turabi's growing prominence created some apprehension in Iran, whose leaders sought to play precisely the role among Islamists that Turabi filled. Their concerns were not assuaged by Turabi's tendency to dismiss Iran's role as a model for Muslims. Iranians were "obsessed by the destruction of the old regime," he said, and so "were forced to go through a reign of terror" without having "any real maturity as regards values."[250] "Islam in that country has been taken over by the Shi'i clergy," he complained on another occasion. Iran was

"more concerned with its material interests than with the real Islamicization of society."[251] Turabi proudly held up Sudan as the true model: "Tehran experienced a revolution, with its march of vengeance and violence, while Khartoum is proceeding down the road of renovation."[252] Such statements did not pass unnoticed in Iran. When Turabi thought to stop there during his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran reportedly informed him that it preferred he did not. Turabi made no Iranian stopover.

While Turabi was not welcome in Tehran, the Vatican in Rome received him with open arms. Pope John Paul II had intensified the Vatican's search for a Muslim partner in dialogue. It had to contend with Islamist pressures on Christians in the ME, including Catholics, and the insistent Islamist charges that the Vatican had a master "strategy" for converting Muslims to Christianity.[253] The initiative toward Turabi dated from February, when the Pope visited Khartoum to conduct a large open-air mass. On that occasion, Cardinal Francis Arinze, head of the Vatican's Secretariat for Non-Christians, visited Turabi at his home. Other Vatican and Sudanese officials subsequently prepared the ground.[254] Turabi's meeting with the Pope was announced only three days before it took place, and he arrived in Rome under the strictest security, flown by private jet and accompanied by imposing bodyguards. The heightened security measures, by both Italians and Sudanese, were intended to prevent an attack on him like that which occurred in the Ottawa airport in May 1992.[255] Turabi's meeting with the Pope took place on 13 October; nothing very revealing came to light about its content. During his visit to Rome, Turabi also appeared in the Italian media, and he participated in a religious dialogue on television with representatives of different faiths (including a rabbi).[256] It was the kind of role Turabi relished, casting him not simply as a Sudanese leader, but as the champion of all Islam in its relations with all other faiths.

CONFERENCES IN KHARTOUM

Sudan also organized a series of Islamic conferences, at the inspiration or under the auspices of Turabi himself. From 12–13 January, Khartoum hosted a conference on human rights in Islam, at the invitation of the Sudanese lawyers' association. This was Sudan's answer to the severe international criticism of its human rights record. Sudan thus sought to bolster its claim to exclusion from generally accepted norms of human rights, by creating alternative norms formulated in the categories of Islam. The conference resolved to create the World Islamic Organization for Human Rights, its 40-member board of trustees including 26 Sudanese and 14 foreign Muslims. Munir Shafiq, a Palestinian Islamist associated with Hamas, was appointed the president of the new organization.[257]

From 8–10 May, Khartoum hosted the second meeting of the Council of Trustees of the Islam in Africa Organization. The first conference of this organization had been held in Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria, in November 1989. At a second meeting in Abuja in 1991, a permanent organization had been established, with headquarters in Nigeria under the chairmanship of former Nigerian chief of staff Gen. Shehu Musa Yar'adua. According to some reports, the organization was financed by Iran, with the purpose of establishing at least one Islamic party in each of the new democracies of Africa.[258] Most of the participants at the conference came from sub-Saharan Africa.[259] Speakers drilled home the point that Africa was the only continent with a Muslim

majority. Turabi addressed the conference, emphasizing that the the struggle against imperialism was common to all Africans.[260]

The most important of these events, the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) met for the second time from 2–4 December in Khartoum[261] (for the first conference, see *MECS* 1991, pp. 182–83).[262] This organization had been established by Turabi as a forum to gather Islamists and their potential allies. Turabi explained that "membership of the conference will not be confined to Islamists, as there are Arabist tendencies and Arab and Islamic ideological parties which will attend by invitation."[263] Turabi conceived the PAIC as the populist alternative to the ICO, and as a platform for his Islam of protest to make itself heard. Nearly 450 participants from almost 60 countries attended the conference, some as representatives of movements, others as independent delegates.

Some of the more noteworthy Islamists in attendance were Mustafa Mashhur, deputy supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Ishaq al-Farhan and 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyyat of Jordan's Islamic Action Front; Muhammad Nazzal and Munir Shafiq of the Palestinian Hamas; Fathi al-Shiqaqi, leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Shaykh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi, leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Bayt al-Maqdis; Shaykh Muhammad Yazbak and an eight-man delegation from Lebanon's Hizballah; Ibrahim al-Masri, emir of Lebanon's al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya; Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, emir of the Tawhid movement in Lebanon; 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din, leader of a faction of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood; 'Isam al-'Attar, the Syrian leader of the Islamist Tali'a, based in Germany; exiled FIS militants Qamar al-Din Kherbane and 'Abdallah Anas; Muhammad al-Hashimi al-Hamdi, the independent Tunisian Islamist; 'Abdallah Benkirane and Ahmad Labbadi of Morocco's *Harakat al-Islah wa'l-Tajdid;* 'Ali al-Kittani of Morocco's *Jama'at al-'Adl wa'l-Ihsan;* a dozen members of Yemen's Islah; Qazi Husayn Ahmad, leader of the Pakistani Jama'ate Islami; Salim 'Azzam, Kalim Siddiqui, and Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens), all prominent Islamists in the UK; and Sidi Khalilou, the emir of the Senegalese 'Ibad al-Rahman. There had been hope that conference would be attended by Afghan President Rabbani, Prime Minister Hikmatyar, and factional leader 'Abd Rabb Rasul al-Sayyaf, among whom Turabi had mediated the previous month (see above). But the battles in Kabul prevented their coming, and they sent representatives in their stead. (Two Pakistani generals, former chief of staff Mirza Aslam Beg and former intelligence chief Hamid Gul, both known for their ties to the Afghan Mujahidin, did attend.) Notable by their absence were Rashid al-Ghannushi, leader of the banned Tunisian Nahda party; Yemen's Islamic party leader and speaker of the Yemeni parliament, Shaykh 'Abdallah bin Husayn al-Ahmar; and representatives of Islamist movements in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Turabi and the organizers said they could not attend because of "personal reasons."[264] Iran, annoyed with Turabi's pretensions, sent a low-level delegation led by a minor intellectual, Muhammad Sa'id Nu'man.

Into this mix, Turabi added representatives of Muslim minorities, including the muftis of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Greece. They were joined by American Black Muslims and the rector of the Grand Mosque in Paris. Invitations even went out to the traditional religious orders: There were participants from the Tijaniyya, the Naqshbandiyya, and the Burhaniyya.

As Turabi promised, the PAIC also invited various secular nationalists, Marxists,

and even low-level representatives of secular regimes with which Turabi had contacts. Representatives attended from George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP; Habash himself did not attend); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP; its leader, Na'if Hawatima, did attend); and the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th parties. Also in attendance were the following emissaries: Somali Gen. Muhammad Farah Aidid; Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic; Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih; Tunisian President Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali; and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat was also invited, but chose not to attend or send a delegate, since he assumed such a conference would criticize, reject, or condemn his accord with Israel.

Not all of the Islamist participants were pleased with the wide net of participation, and especially the inclusion of Arab nationalists, who had a long history of opposing and oppressing them. This surfaced at several points in the proceedings. An Afghan demanded that "Arab" be dropped from the name of the congress. In a speech during the conference, the independent Islamist from Tunisia, Muhammad al-Hashimi al-Hamdi, denounced Arabism and the separation of religion and state. His remarks led to a verbal altercation with 'Abdallah Fadil 'Abbas, Iraq's minister of religious endowment and religious affairs, sent to Khartoum to defend the interests of Saddam's Arabism.[265] The search for some common ground among these different and even competing political forces posed a formidable challenge to Turabi.

Turabi, in his opening address, said that the first conference of the PAIC in 1991 had produced nothing extreme or violent, but both he and his organization had been made targets of a campaign of distortion. The remainder of the address constituted an amalgam of contradictions, part anti-Western diatribe, part appeal for dialogue with Christianity and the West. In addressing the Palestine issue, Turabi showed caution. The Palestinians were divided, he pointed out; the conference would work to help them restore their unity. Turabi expressed his opposition to US imperialism in Somalia, his regret at the fratricide in Afghanistan, and his outrage at the genocide in Bosnia. The point of the conference, he pointed out, was to create a climate for breaking traditional interpretations of Islam, for renewal (*tajdid*) and for ending traditional sectarian divisions. The conference would bring together the Sunni and the Shi'i, the nationalist and the Islamist, the Sufi mystic and the *salafi* reformer.[266]

Turabi then safely steered the unruly conference precisely toward those resolutions he had decided upon in advance, especially on the sensitive issues of Palestine and Bosnia. On Palestine, Turabi did not wish anyone to conclude that Sudan would actively undermine the PLO. To make his point, he drew a typically Turabi-esque distinction: "As for us at the PAIC, we criticize the accord without aiming the criticism against Yasir 'Arafat or the PLO leadership." In an even more evasive dodge, he announced that the conference "will not condemn the accord. However, it will not support it one hundred percent, because it does not lead to the establishment of two states, Palestinian and Israeli, but, rather, to the establishment of a Palestinian municipality in Gaza and Jericho."[267] In the end, the conference did not "condemn" the Gaza-Jericho accord, preferring to announce its "total rejection." The resolution said Palestinians had the right to self-determination and an independent, sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital. The PAIC also called on Arab and Muslim governments not to normalize relations with Israel until all the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people were restored.[268]

Given the makeup of the conference, this resolution stirred considerable controversy. It implied endorsement of a two-state solution to the Palestine question — a solution rejected by the great preponderance of Sunni and Shi'i Islamists, and there was no express call for Jihad against the accord. The Hizballah delegation protested that this resolution did not suffice. Hizballah called for clear condemnation of the accord and an appeal to undermine it. Fathi al-Shiqaqi of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad told the press that "total rejection" was not sufficient: "We want a more determined resolution, we want to condemn those who signed the agreement and to call on our people to defeat it."[269] Hamas also expressed disappointment with the resolution, observing that 'Arafat was present at the conference even in his absence.[270] But no one could effectively challenge Turabi's artful guidance of the Palestine resolution to passage. It assured that this time, Turabi's PAIC would be perceived as moderate — just what Sudan needed, as it sought to refute its recent inclusion in the US terror list.

On Bosnia, Turabi faced an unexpected crisis. The mufti of Bosnia-Herzegovina gave a speech calling for a boycott of British and French products, in the latter case especially of perfumes.[271] The mufti thus expressed the widespread sense among Bosnian Muslims that Britain and France, of all the Western powers, had done the most to prevent Bosnia from arming itself. Much to the mufti's astonishment, Turabi transformed this into a resolution for boycotting British and *American* goods.[272] The explanation: Turabi, anxious to circumvent the US definition of Sudan as a terror state, was busy cultivating good relations with France. "We have no complexes about France," he announced after the conference. "France has major assets for becoming the preferred interlocutor of the Muslim peoples once again — its feeling for law, its influence in Africa, its knowledge of the Arab world, and its advanced technology."[273] France had done nothing for Bosnian Muslims to earn such favored treatment. And Turabi's view must have been anathema to North African Islamists, since France supported the oppressive policies of the Algerian and Tunisian Governments. Of all the Western powers, France also had been the most severe in dealing with Islamists seeking refuge there (see above). But at the PAIC, the interest of Sudan prevailed, cloaked by Turabi as the collective interest of all Islam: America, not France, would be boycotted.

Other resolutions called for a lifting of the international embargoes against Libya and Iraq — resolutions neither country had been able to secure from the ICO. The conference also created two committees, one to promote Iranian-Iraqi dialogue, the other to follow relations between Islamic movements and governments. These were meant to cater to Turabi's penchant for mediation. The PAIC also took strides toward institutionalization. The general secretariat would be abolished. Instead there would be a 50-member council of trustees, with the following composition: 14 members from Arab states; 10 from the rest of Asia; six from North and South America and the Caribbean; five from African states north of the Sahara; five from West and Central Africa; five from East and Southern Africa; and five from Europe. This council would meet every six months; a general conference would meet every year. The PAIC, funded so far by Sudan, would be financed by donations collected from members and Arab and Muslim peoples and institutions.[274]

The entertainment complemented the resolutions. Participants watched a military parade of the Popular Defense Forces, with the participation of 20,000 men and 3,000

women, and witnessed a mass marriage of hundreds of couples.[275] Visiting troupes kept the delegates entertained during the evenings. A Hamas troupe led them in chanting "the land is ours, Jerusalem is ours, God is with us." A Bosnian troupe joined them in stirring chants of "God is Great," and a poet sang them a song with memorable lyrics: "We will never submit, we will never bow, we will never obey the Americans!"[276] Turabi meanwhile regaled the assembled Western journalists with interviews, pleading once again that he had been misunderstood by the world.

Assessments of the conference varied widely. Predictably, the Egyptian press called the conference a cover for terror.[277] Mustafa Mashhur, from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, predictably claimed otherwise: "A conference attended by hundreds of reasonable and mature key figures from all over the world who work in broad daylight cannot be described as terrorist or extremist."[278] One way or another, there could be no doubt that Turabi put on the best show in the world of Islamic activism. Whether he actually gave that world a sense of direction seemed less certain.

And Islam needed a sense of direction. Paul Kennedy, author of *Preparing for the 21st Century,* put it succinctly:

> Far from preparing for the 21st century, much of the Arab and Muslim world appears to have difficulty in coming to terms with the 19th century, with its composite legacy of secularism, democracy, laissez-faire economics, industrial and commercial linkages among different nations, social change, and intellectual questioning. If one needed an example of the importance of cultural attitudes in explaining a society's response to change, contemporary Islam provides it.[279]

Perhaps beneath the plethora of conferences and counter-conferences, someone was considering the need for reform. If so, it remained one of Islam's best kept secrets.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here. The publication *al-'Alam* cited here is the London weekly.

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50. *Al-'Alam*, 11 September 1993.
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52. The symposium is recalled by Muhammad al-Hashimi al-Hamidi in *al-'Alam*, 19 June 1993.
53. Fahd's speech, SPA, 1 June — DR, 2 June 1993.
54. *Al-Liwa al-Islami*, 20 May 1993.
55. *Al-'Alam*, 13 March, 17, 24 April 1993.
56. Saudi TV, 11 March — DR, 12 March 1993.
57. *Al-Muslimun* (Saudi Arabia), 30 April 1993.
58. R. Tehran, 4 January — DR, 6 January; IRNA, 20 February — DR, 24 February 1993.
59. R. Tehran, 10 May — DR, 11 May 1993.
60. *Al-'Alam*, 12 June 1993.
61. R. Tehran, 27 May — DR, 28 May 1993.
62. Statement by "reponsible source," SPA, 2 June — DR, 3 June 1993.
63. SPA, 29 May — DR, 1 June 1993.
64. SPA, 2 June — DR, 3 June 1993.
65. Khamene'i's message, Iranian TV, 27 May — DR, 28 May 1993.
66. IRNA, 2 June — DR, 2 June 1993.
67. Saudi TV, 2 June — DR, 3 June 1993.
68. IRNA, 3, 4 June — DR, 4 June 1993.

67. IRNA, 5 June — DR, 7 June 1993.
68. Interview with Nateq-Nuri, *Middle East Insight*, July-August 1993.
69. JANA, 30 April — DR, 4 May 1993.
70. For the Nimrodi version of events, stressing his motive of promoting Muslim tourism, see Leslie Susser, "PR Pilgrimage," *Jerusalem Report*, 1 July 1993. Nimrodi said it was Khashoggi who "served as a middleman between Qadhdhafi and myself." Interview with Nimrodi, R. IDF, 31 May — DR, 1 June 1993. Khashoggi denied being involved in the initative; *al-Hayat* (London), 5 June 1993.
71. *Ha'aretz*, 1 June 1993.
72. *JP*, 1 June 1993.
73. *NYT*, 1 June 1993.
74. *JP*, 1 June 1993.
75. *JP*, 2 June 1993.
76. *Ma'ariv*, 4 June 1993.
77. Muhammad Sharaf al-Din al-Fayturi, Libyan ambassador to Belgium and the European Community, quoted by R. Monte Carlo, 1 June — DR, 2 June 1993.
78. Interview with Qadhdhafi, *Middle East Insight*, September-October 1993.
79. Interview with unidentified Libyan pilgrim, Libyan TV, 8 June — DR, 14 June 1993.
80. JANA, 31 May — DR, 1 June; *JP*, *Ha'aretz*, *NYT*, 2 June 1993.
81. *Ha'aretz*, 3 June 1993.
82. *Le Monde*, 7 June 1993.
83. The claim of Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres; interview with Peres, VoI, 2 June — DR, 2 June 1993.
84. Doug Struck, "Libyan Pilgrims to Israel Turn Against Their Hosts," *Baltimore Sun*, 2 June 1993.
85. For this interpretation, see *al-Wasat*, 7 June 1993.
86. See *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 16 July 1993.
87. Charles Krauthammer, "The New Evil Empire," *WP*, reprinted in *JP*, 1 January 1993.
88. *Briefing*, 1, 8 February, 25 October 1993.
89. *Al-Watan* (Algiers), 20 March, 10 April — JPRS, 12 May; *L'Express*, 6 May 1993.
90. Speech by Edward Djerejian before the World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, November 30, 1993.
91. *Al-Bilad*, 16 October 1993, which also brings eight examples.
92. Rushdie had spent over £250,000 on his own protection; Scotland Yard gave no figures, but the cost to the British Government was estimated at £1m.
93. *NYT*, 6 February 1993.
94. *NYT*, 15 February 1993. For Rushdie's campaign in Britain, see Julian Barnes, "Letter from London: Staying Alive," *New Yorker*, 21 February 1994, pp. 99–105.
95. IRNA, 9 February — DR, 10 February 1993.
96. *Monday Morning*, 6 March 1993.
97. *ME*, 5 March; Rafsanjani's interview, *al-Majalla*, 26 May–1 June 1993.
98. *TT International*, 29 April 1993.
99. *KI*, 16 February 1993.
100. *Le Monde*, 16 February 1993.
101. *Le Monde*, 20 March 1993.
102. *Briefing*, 31 May 1993.
103. *Briefing*, 5, 19 July 1993.
104. Letter by Rushdie, *The Independent*, 6 July 1993.
105. *FT*, 12 October 1993.
106. *WP*, *NYT*, 1 December 1993.
107. *NYT*, 25 November 1993.
108. *Boston Globe*, 27 November; *WP*, 28 November; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1 December 1993. An exception was Patrick Buchanan: "When Bill Clinton embraced [Rushdie], he dealt cards to our enemies, not to our friends." *WT*, 1 December 1993.
109. *Abrar*, 27 November — DR, 7 December 1993.
110. *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 27 November; *al-Nahar* (Jerusalem), 28 November; *al-Watan* (Kuwait), 28 November 1993.

111. Quoted in *LAT*, 29 November 1993.
112. Rida Kefi in *Le Temps* (Tunis), 2 December 1993.
113. Muhammad Jabir al-Ansari in *al-Sharq* (Qatar), 1 December 1993.
114. *WP, NYT*, 1 December 1993.
115. USIA release, "Clinton Met with Rushdie to Reaffirm Freedom of Speech," 30 November 1993.
116. R. Tehran, 1 December — DR, 1 December 1993.
117. *NYT*, 2 December 1993.
118. *WT*, 6 December 1993.
119. Interview with Nasrallah, *al-Diyar*, 19–29 December 1993.
120. Interview with Tufayli, *Magazine*, 11 June 1993.
121. *FR*, 27 May, 4 November; *al-Shira'*, 24 May; *Magazine*, 11 June 1993.
122. The positions of the Iraqi Da'wa are described in *al-Hayat* (London), 22 October 1993.
123. Article by Musawi, *al-Shira'*, 8 November; interview with Musawi, *al-Shu'la* (Beirut), 29 October 1993.
124. Open letter by Shaykh Hasan Shahin, *al-Shira'*, 6 September 1993.
125. Text of letter in *al-Shira'*, 13 September 1993.
126. Interview with Nasrallah, *al-Diyar*, 19 December — DR, 29 December 1993.
127. Commentary by Mohtashami, *Salam*, 2 August — DR, 10 August 1993.
128. Interview with Tufayli, *Magazine*, 11 June 1993.
129. *Al-Shira'*, 4 January 1993.
130. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 12, 24 August 1993.
131. Interview with Nasrallah, *al-Safir*, 27 August 1993.
132. *Al-'Alam*, 17 April 1993.
133. On the hospital, see *al-Bilad*, 20 November 1993.
134. *Al-Bilad*, 27 November 1993.
135. See also "Tehran and the Shi'ite Clergy — An Uneasy Relationship," *MEI*, 4 February 1994.
136. Tehran TV, 10 December — SWB, 13 December 1993.
137. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 17 December 1993.
138. Speech by Yazdi, R. Tehran, 17 December — SWB, 20 December 1993.
139. IRNA, 18 December — SWB, 20 December 1993.
140. Sermon by Meshkini, Tehran TV, 24 December — SWB, 29 December 1993.
141. R. Tehran, 28 December — DR, 29 December 1993.
142. The case for him was presented in an interview with Mahdi Ruhani, *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 5 March 1993.
143. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 26 March 1993.
144. *Al-Wasat*, 16 August 1993.
145. Sermon by Meshkini, Tehran TV, 24 December — SWB, 29 December 1993.
146. The Ahl al-Bayt League, under the auspices of Khamene'i, condemned Sadr's appointment by Saddam in a statement; see *al-'Alam*, 6 February 1993. On the League, see *MECS* 1990, p. 181.
147. On Sabzevari's politics, especially during the Shi'i uprising in Iraq in 1991, see *al-Bilad*, 25 September 1993.
148. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-Wasat*, 16 August 1993.
149. *Al-Nahar*, 10 December 1993.
150. *Al-Shira'*, 27 September 1993 — JPRS, 6 January 1994. This may have been done in preparation for his own bid to emerge as *marja'-e taqlid* in the near future. He had reportedly published his own legal treatise, a precondition for any candidacy. It was reported that the treatise was published and warehoused for future release. Leaflets were reportedly distributed in Qom, accusing Fadlallah of harboring this ambition. See *al-Shira'*, 29 November 1993. For Fadlallah's view of the Marja'iyya, see *MECS* 1992, pp. 211–12.
151. *Al-Shira'*, 10 January 1994.
152. Majid Kho'i quoted in *al-Wasat*, 16 August 1993.
153. Interview with Mohammad Salameh, *Inquiry*, June-July 1993.
154. *NYT*, 25, 28 June 1993.
155. On the shaykh's career, see AFP, 5 March — DR, 8 March; *NYT*, 14 March; *al-Majalla*,

17–23 March; Judith Miller, "Bloody Sheikh," *New Republic*, 29 March; Mary Anne Weaver, "The Trail of the Sheikh," *New Yorker*, 12 April; "How Sheikh Omar Rose to Lead Islamic War While Fluding the Law," *WSJ*, 1 September 1993.

156. *NYT*, 26 August 1993.
157. *NYT*, 6 May 1994.
158. For more on the context of the bombing, see Martin Kramer, "Islam and the West (including Manhattan)," *Commentary*, October 1993, pp. 33–37.
159. On Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman's activities in Pakistan and the US, see Robert I. Friedman, "The CIA and the Sheikh," *Village Voice*, 30 March; "The Making of an Islamic Symbol," *WP*, 9 July; "Trail of Tumult on U.S. Soil," *WP*, 11 July; Fouad Ajami, "Have Sermon, will travel," *US News & World Report*, 12 July; *al-Wasat*, 12 July 1993.
160. On Abu Halima, see *NYT*, 18 March 1993.
161. On Hampton-El, see *Al-Fuqra: Holy Warriors of Terrorism* (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 1993), pp. 5–7.
162. *LAT*, 2 August 1993.
163. *NYT*, 7 April 1993.
164. Charles G. Cogan, "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 73–82. Cogan was chief of the Near East and South Asia Division of the CIA's Directorate of Operations from 1979 to 1984.
165. For overviews, see "Radical Arabs Use Pakistan as Base for Holy War," *NYT*, 8 April; "U.S. Aid to Afghan Rebels Proves a Deadly Boomerang," *LAT*, 2 August; "La guerre sans fin des 'Afghans,'" *JA*, 5 August; "Where Arab Militants Train and Wait," *NYT*, 11 August 1993.
166. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 10 May 1993.
167. *Al-'Alam*, 10 April 1993.
168. *Al-'Alam*, 8 May; *al-Musawwar*, 27 August 1993.
169. *Al-'Alam al-Islami*, 22 February 1993.
170. Islamabad TV, 25 April — DR, 26 April 1993.
171. *The Muslim*, 5 November; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 6 November — DR, 10 November 1993.
172. "Mercenaires islamistes en Afghanistan," *Le Monde*, 11 August 1993.
173. *NYT*, 11 August 1993.
174. Muhammad Sadiq, quoted in *Akhir Sa'a*, 27 January 1993.
175. AFP, 15 November — DR, 16 November; MENA, 20 November — DR, 22 November 1993.
176. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 7 November 1993.
177. Interview with Hikmatyar, *al-Wasat*, 6 September 1993.
178. Ibid.
179. *Al-Hayat* (London), 28 April 1993.
180. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 10 December 1993.
181. *Al-Qabas*, 30 April 1993.
182. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 10 May 1993.
183. *Al-Da'wa* (Islamabad), 7 October 1993.
184. Some sources claimed that the CIA orchestrated the shaykh's easy entry. A State Department inquiry showed the issuance of his visas to be the result of bureaucratic errors. See the official text of the statement by Sherman M. Funk, inspector general of the Department of State, delivered on 22 July to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, subcommittee on international security, international organizations and human rights; and *NYT*, 3 July 1993.
185. Ehud Ya'ari, "A Safe Haven for Hamas in America," *NYT*, 27 January; interview with Ya'ari, VoI, 31 January — DR, 1 February; Ehud Ya'ari, "America the Free," *Jerusalem Report*, 25 February 1993.
186. *JP*, 1, 2 February 1993.
187. Quote by Brig.-Gen. Meir Dagan, *Hadashot*, 27 January 1993.
188. Danny Rubinstein, "The International Balloon of Hamas," *Ha'aretz*, 5 February 1993.
189. *NYT*, 4 February 1993.
190. *NYT*, 4, 21 February 1993.
191. *Ha'aretz*, 1 February; Bruce Nelan, "Hamas and the Heartland," *Time*, 15 February 1993.

The press reports are also summarized in *Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood Islamic Extremists and the Terrorist Threat to America* (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 1993). For a rebuttal, see Ahmad Abul Jobain, *Radical Islamic Terrorism or Political Islam?* (Annandale, Virginia: United Association for Studies and Research, Occasional Papers No. 1, June 1993), pp. 25–29.

192. *Al-Hayat* (London), 21 September 1993; *Algérie Actualité*, 16 November 1993 — JPRS, 11 January 1994.
193. *CR*, Tunisia, No. 4, 1993, p. 11.
194. *CR*, Tunisia, No. 1, 1994, p. 11.
195. Interview with El Houari, *Le Figaro*, 29 October 1993.
196. France-2 TV, 13 November — DR, 15 November 1993.
197. *Al-'Alam*, 21 August 1993.
198. E.g., letter from the Tunisian Embassy to *al-'Alam*, 29 May 1993.
199. Ghannushi, quoted in *NYT*, 9 January 1994.
200. Voice of the Oppressed (Ba'albak), 16 October — DR, 21 October 1993.
201. *Al-Da'wa* (Islamabad), 24 February 1994.
202. Interview with Ghannushi, *al-Shira'*, 15 February; *al-'Alam*, 24 April 1993. The official was Edward Djerejian.
203. *L'Express*, 6 May 1993.
204. *Al-Bilad*, 19 June 1993.
205. *L'Express*, 6 May; *al-Hayat* (London), 21 September 1993.
206. *Al-Ahali*, 16 June; *al-Musawwar*, 27 August 1993.
207. *Al-Hayat* (London), 5 November; interview with Zawahiri, *al-'Arabi*, 22 November 1993.
208. *Akhir Sa'a*, 15 September 1993.
209. Quoted by Marc Yared, "L'empêcheur de negocier en rond," *JA*, 7 October 1993.
210. Interview with Ruhani, Voice of the South (clandestine), 10 September — DR, 13 September 1993.
211. For a detailed discussion of the position of the Palestinian Islamist factions on the accord, see 'Ali al-Jarbawi, "Mawqif al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Filastiniyya min al-Ittifaq al-Filastini al-Isra'ili," *al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, February 1994, pp. 52–74. Text of Hamas announcement (no. 102) and press statement, *Filastin al-Muslima*, October 1993.
212. *Al-Sha'b*, 7 September 1993.
213. Summary of various Islamist positions, *al-'Alam*, 25 September 1993.
214. Text of Khamene'i's statement, *Ila al-Amam*, 7 October 1993.
215. *Al-Da'wa* (Islamabad), 23 September; interview with Mashhur, *Filastin al-Muslima*, November 1993.
216. Ziyad Abu 'Amr, "Hamas: Khalfiyya Ta'rikhiyya Siyasiyya," *Dirasat Filastiniyya*, Winter 1993, pp. 92–93.
217. Interview with Ghawsha, *Akhir Khabar* (Amman), 18–19 October — DR, 20 October 1993.
218. For details on the debate over Hamas during the year, see Ahmad Rashad, *Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue* (Annandale, Virginia: United Association for Studies and Research, Occasional Papers No. 2, December 1993).
219. Interview with Abu Marzuq, *Filastin al-Muslima*, February 1993.
220. *FR*, 10 June 1993.
221. Interview with Ghawsha, *Sawt al-Sha'b* (Amman), 21 December — DR, 22 December 1993.
222. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 11 August 1993.
223. Interview with Nasrallah, *The Independent*, 10 November 1993.
224. Interview with Ghawsha, *Inquiry*, January 1993.
225. Interview with Ghawsha, *JP*, 24 December 1993.
226. *Ha'aretz*, 10 January 1993.
227. Interview with Ghawsha, *JP*, 24 December 1993.
228. Interview with Ghawsha, *Sawt al-Sha'b* (Amman), 21 December — DR, 22 December 1993.
229. *Al-Akhbar, al-Jumhuriyya* (Cairo), 5 February; *al-Ahram, Akhbar al-Yawm*, 6 February 1993.

230. *Al-Ahram,* 14 June 1993.
231. *Al-Hayat* (London), 7 April 1993.
232. Report on meeting, *Shishi,* 6 May 1994.
233. Interview with Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Shami, *al-Safir,* 29 December 1992.
234. Interview with Ghawsha, *al-'Alam,* 9 October 1993.
235. The question is summarized by Hani Raslan, "Al-Sudan wa'l-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Dur wa-Ab'ad al-'Alaqa," *al-Siyasa al-Duwaliyya,* July 1993.
236. Interview with Turabi, *al-Shira',* 24 May — DR, 27 May 1993. The remark was made in connection with the Egyptian-Sudanese dispute over the Hala'ib border area. For more on his outlook, see Hassan A. Turabi, "Islam as a Pan-National Movement," *RSA Journal* 140 (1992), pp. 608–19.
237. Interview with Turabi, *al-Hayat* (London), 13 November 1993.
238. *NYT,* 19 August 1993.
239. Interview with Ibrahim 'Umar, minister of higher education, *al-Quds al-'Arabi,* 31 August 1993.
240. Interview with Turabi, *al-Safir,* 25 February — DR, 4 March 1993.
241. Interview with Turabi, *Libération,* 17 March — DR, 22 March 1993.
242. From the preface to the valuable profile by Marc Yared, "Cet homme est-il dangereux?," *Jeune Afrique,* 8 April 1993.
243. Mahmud al-Rimawi in *al-Ra'y* (Amman), 2 December 1993.
244. Text of protocol, *al-Safir,* 2 February 1993.
245. Interview with Turabi, *al-Shira',* 24 May 1993.
246. Marc Yared, "Un GPRA islamiste," *Jeune Afrique,* 30 September 1993.
247. Interview with Turabi, *Le Figaro,* 25 January — DR, 26 January 1994.
248. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi,* 26 November 1993.
249. *Al-Hayat* (London), 18, 22 November 1993.
250. Interview with Turabi, *Libération,* 17 March — DR, 22 March 1993.
251. Interview with Turabi, *Le Figaro Magazine,* 17 April — DR, 19 April 1993.
252. Turabi quoted in *Jeune Afrique,* 8 April 1993.
253. A typical example is the book by Muhammad 'Imara, *Istratijiyyat al-Tansir fi'l-'Alam al-Islami,* published by the Islamic World Studies Center and reviewed in *al-'Alam,* 13 February 1993.
254. Marc Yared, "Le pape reçoit l'Antéchrist," *Jeune Afrique,* 11 November 1993.
255. *Jeune Afrique,* 21 October 1993.
256. *Al-Inqadh al-Watani,* 15 October 1993.
257. *Al-Bilad,* 6 February 1993. For Shafiq's apologia for Sudan, see his article, "Hawla al-Tajriba al-Islamiyya fi'l-Sudan," *al-Insan* (Paris), December 1992, pp. 26–37.
258. E.g., *FR,* 29 July 1993.
259. R. Omdurman, 11 May — DR, 14 May 1993.
260. *Sudanow,* June 1993.
261. For a detailed account, see Marc Yared, "Islamistes de tous les pays...," *Jeune Afrique,* 22 December 1993.
262. For more background, see *al-Majalla,* 5-11 December 1993.
263. *Al-Hayat* (London), 29 November 1993.
264. SUNA, 6 December — DR, 7 December 1993.
265. AFP, 5 December — DR, 6 December; *Jeune Afrique,* 22 December 1993. Hamidi was an admirer of Turabi and editor of a volume of 1987 interviews with him, entitled *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi'l-Sudan* (n.p., n.d.).
266. Turabi's speech, *al-Sudan al-Hadith,* 3 December; *al-Inqadh al-Watani,* 3 December 1993.
267. Interview with Turabi, *al-Hayat* (London), 13 November 1993.
268. Resolutions of the conference, AFP, 5 December; R. Omdurman, 5 December — DR, 6 December; *Le Monde,* 7 December 1993.
269. AFP, 5 December 1993.
270. *Filastin al-Muslima,* January 1994.
271. *Al-Inqadh al-Watani,* 3 December; R. Omdurman, 2 December — DR, 6 December 1993.
272. *Jeune Afrique,* 9 December 1993.
273. Interview with Turabi, *Le Figaro,* 25 January — DR, 26 January 1994.

SUNA, 8 December DR, 9 December 1993.
Al Inqadh al Watani, 3 December, *al-Hayat* (London), 4 December 1993.
Al Inqadh al Watani, 3 December 1993.
E.g., article by Ibrahim Nafi', chief editor, in *al-Ahram*, 10 December 1993.
Al Sha'b, 14 December 1993.
Paul Kennedy in *The New York Review of Books*, 11 February 1993.